Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism by Pfander, James E. & Aggarwal, Neil
University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 8
Issue 3 Spring 2011 Article 7
2011
Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of
Dynamic Textualism
James E. Pfander
Neil Aggarwal
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.
Bluebook Citation
James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism, 8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 417 (2011).
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 65 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 65 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-MAY-12 16:31
ARTICLE
BIVENS, THE JUDGMENT BAR, AND THE
PERILS OF DYNAMIC TEXTUALISM
JAMES E. PFANDER* AND NEIL AGGARWAL**
The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason
of the same subject matter, against the employee of the govern-
ment whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.1
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INTRODUCTION
Something has gone terribly wrong with the interpretation of the judg-
ment bar provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).2 Enacted back
in 1946, when the FTCA first became law, the judgment bar was designed
to block a specific kind of duplicative litigation that could result from the
government’s acceptance of respondeat superior liability in suits for ordi-
nary negligence. The provision was enacted with suits against the drivers of
government vehicles in mind: it would, for example, block negligence suits
against the driver of a federal postal truck whose act or omission had given
rise to an earlier negligence suit against the federal government.3 The idea
was straightforward: once a tort plaintiff has pursued a vicarious liability
claim against the federal government to judgment, whether successfully or
unsuccessfully, the judgment bar would block a later negligence suit against
the federal employee for the same act or omission. (If the plaintiff settled
with the government under the FTCA, the statutory release or settlement
bar would likewise foreclose litigation against the employee.) The statute,
in short, was meant to codify narrow versions of the judgment and release
bars that had developed at common law (as part of the moderation of strict
mutuality) and to ensure state court respect for the federal disposition.
Today, in what can only be regarded as the product of breathtakingly
dynamic statutory interpretation, courts have interpreted the judgment bar
to block a much broader range of claims than those made actionable under
the FTCA. Perhaps most troubling, courts have applied the judgment bar to
preclude constitutional tort claims brought under the authority of Bivens v.
Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.4 Such Biv-
ens claims, as they have come to be known, seek to impose liability on the
officer or employee in her personal capacity. The government itself bears
2. On the origins of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort
Claims Act—A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–9 (1946); LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT
C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 1.01 (2011); WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1–10 (1957). The judgment bar has largely, but not entirely, escaped
scholarly attention. See, e.g., Stefan Sciaraffa, Note, Section 2676 of the FTCA: Why it Should not
Bar Contemporaneously Filed Bivens Claims, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 147 (1996) (discussing the
FTCA judgment bar).
3. Tort Claims: H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
77th Cong. 9 (1942) [hereinafter Tort Claims] (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
4. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Courts hold that the judgment bar can bar a Bivens action. E.g.,
Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 2008); Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958,
964–65 (10th Cir. 2001); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1437 (9th Cir. 1994); Serra v.
Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 241–42 (6th Cir. 1986).
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no liability for Bivens claims; both the Supreme Court5 and Congress6 have
consistently refused to impose vicarious or respondeat superior liability on
the government for the constitutional torts of its employees. While one
might suppose that the absence of vicarious liability under the FTCA would
end the matter, the lower federal courts have nonetheless extended the judg-
ment bar to Bivens claims.
In perhaps the most arresting example of this expansive application of
the judgment bar rule, the Seventh Circuit held that the judgment bar ap-
plies retroactively to vitiate a Bivens judgment.7 In Manning v. United
States, the plaintiff obtained a substantial Bivens verdict against agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.8 Manning also brought a separate
FTCA claim against the federal government.9 Not only did the judge, sitting
without a jury, reject the FTCA claim, but he also ruled that his disposition
retroactively invalidated Manning’s earlier jury verdict on the Bivens
claim.10 Apparently without carefully evaluating the limits of the judgment
bar and the threat to the constitutional right to trial by jury, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.11 In the end, specific jury findings of official misconduct
rising to the level of a constitutional violation were set aside by a judge’s
determination that the facts would not support a government tort claim
under the FTCA.12
Understanding why this wrongheaded view of the judgment bar has
taken hold in the federal courts—and the Seventh Circuit is by no means
alone13—will take time and a patient reconstruction of the evolving inter-
pretation of the statute. Before we begin the task of reconstruction, how-
ever, we offer an overview from a relatively high level of generality. In
brief, the story goes like this: The FTCA’s judgment bar was adopted in
1946 out of concern with the prospect of duplicative litigation against the
government and its employees. Preclusion rules reflected in state common
law and the 1942 Restatement of Judgments provided a measure of protec-
tion against duplicative litigation in the master-servant context. If an injured
5. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994).
6. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 131 (2009).
7. Manning, 546 F.3d at 438.
8. Id. at 432.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 438.
12. Id.
13. For cases that apply the judgment bar to Bivens claims raised in the same suit, see, for
example, Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 241–42 (6th Cir. 1986); Harris v. United States, 422
F.3d 322, 333–34 (6th Cir. 2005); Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 397
F.3d 840, 859 (10th Cir. 2005). For the suggestion that the judgment bar applies even to FTCA
claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see for example, Hoosier Bancorp of Ind., Inc. v. Ras-
mussen, 90 F.3d 180, 184–85 (7th Cir. 1996); Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 964–65 (10th Cir.
2001). For the retroactive application of the judgment bar, see Manning, 546 F.3d at 438; Aguilar,
397 F.3d at 859; Engle v. Mecke, 24 F.3d 133, 135–36 (10th Cir. 1994).
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plaintiff first sued the servant on a theory of negligence and lost, based on a
finding of non-negligence, the exoneration would block a second suit
against the master.14 While the master and servant were not in privity, com-
mon law courts nonetheless recognized that a judgment in the first action
might fairly bar the second claim; after all, the liability of the master would
depend on a showing of negligence that the plaintiff had failed to make.15
For complex reasons of mutuality that we will explore in greater detail be-
low, however, many state courts and the Restatement refused to treat the
judgment in an action against the master as a bar to further litigation against
the servant even where the issue of negligence had been resolved against
the plaintiff.16
The FTCA was drafted to fill this gap by allowing the employee to
assert a defense of non-mutual issue preclusion following an unsuccessful
action against the government. With its creation of a rule of non-mutual
issue preclusion, the judgment bar applied in the main to situations of deriv-
ative liability where the issue of negligence in the first proceeding was
identical to the issue of negligence in the second proceeding.17 Because it
depended on the essential identity of the negligence issues that arose in the
vicarious liability context, the judgment bar had no application when the
initial judgment did not negate the liability of the defendant in the second
action.18 Imagine that the government successfully defended an FTCA
claim on the ground that the employee had committed an assault rather than
an act of simple negligence. Such an argument might succeed, for example,
in the context of malpractice litigation, at least in states that characterized
malpractice as an assault when the physician performed an operation that
exceeded the scope of the patient’s consent.19 An assault characterization
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1)(a) (1942) (declaring that in an action by
the injured party against the servant, where the master has a right to claim indemnity, a valid
judgment against the injured party “terminates the cause of action against the [master]”).
15. See Canin v. Kesse, 28 A.2d 68, 70 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1942) (“Strictly speaking, master and
servant are not in privity, but, where the relationship is undisputed and the action is purely deriva-
tive and dependent upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, it constitutes an exception to the
general rule.”); Wolf v. Kenyon, 273 N.Y.S. 170, 171–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (similar
holding).
16. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96(2) (1942) (the entry of judgment in an
earlier action by the injured party against the master has no effect in a subsequent claim against
the servant).
17. See Davis v. Perryman, 286 S.W.2d 844, 847–48 (Ark. 1956) (applying judgment bar to
block suit against servant for the “same mishap” where it was conceded in the first suit that the
servant was at all times acting within the scope of employment); Canin, 28 A.2d at 69 (applying
judgment bar to block suit against servant following an exoneration of the master “for the same
negligent act”).
18. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 532 (1965); Note, The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 559 n.170 (1947) (citing Gould v. Evansville & Crawfordsville
R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 526 (1875)) (holding that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
“cannot be res judicata of the issues involved in the action”).
19. See Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275, 276–77 (D. Minn. 1954) (concluding that
surgeon who operated on the wrong leg had committed an assault that fell outside the scope of the
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would exonerate the government; the FTCA recognized vicarious liability
for negligent acts committed in the scope of employment, but it expressly
excluded assault claims from its coverage.20 Needless to say, a judgment for
the government based on the assault exception would not exonerate the phy-
sician from personal tort liability under state malpractice law. As a result,
the victim was free to pursue the assault claim against the physician not-
withstanding the codification of the judgment bar.
The judgment bar implemented this rule of non-mutual issue preclu-
sion with language that has grown more ambiguous with the passage of
time. By its terms, the statute makes a judgment in an action against the
government “a complete bar to any action” brought against the employee
“by reason of the same subject matter.”21 The drafters borrowed the “same
subject matter” reference from the Restatement where it had been used to
describe a narrow subset of claims that rested on the same theory of liabil-
ity.22 The “same subject matter” formulation was meant to capture the logic
underlying the judgment bar’s relaxation of mutuality; only when the prior
decision addressed the identical legal question—the “same subject mat-
ter”—was it fair to treat the prior judgment as a bar to a subsequent claim
against the employee.23 On this view, a government judgment on the basis
of a finding of non-negligence fairly bars a negligence claim against the
employee arising from the same act or omission. A government judgment
on some other basis, however, should not bar a suit against the employee on
theories of tort liability that the prior judgment fails to negate. No issue
preclusive effect attaches to such a judgment.
The model of government tort litigation has changed in the last genera-
tion. First, the Bivens decision in 1971 recognized an implied federal cause
FTCA); cf. United States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1950) (lengthy investigation
amounted to an assault and therefore fell outside the scope of FTCA’s coverage); Duenges v.
United States, 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (honorably discharged army veteran wrongly
jailed for desertion amounted to false arrest and imprisonment and therefore fell outside the scope
of the FTCA’s coverage).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006) excepted claims arising out of assault, battery, false impris-
onment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights from the ambit of the FTCA. However, claimants were
still free to pursue other intentional tort claims against the Government. Such claims included:
trespass, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Paul F. Figley, Understand-
ing the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105,
1131–32 (2009) (collecting cases).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006) (emphasis added).
22. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 70, 84 (1942).
23. Congressional testimony discussing the judgment bar indicates that Congress anticipated
that the judgment bar would only bar subsequent claims that were functionally equivalent to
claims that had been tried to judgment against the government under the FTCA. Tort Claims,
supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the judgment bar and stating the “judgment in a tort action consti-
tutes a bar to further action upon the same claim, not only against the Government (as would have
been true [in the absence of the judgment bar]) but also against the delinquent employee . . . . ”)
(emphasis added).
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of action for those alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.24
Next, the 1974 amendments to the FTCA broadened the scope of the gov-
ernment’s liability to include certain intentional torts committed by law en-
forcement officers.25 In expanding the government’s respondeat superior
liability, Congress obviously broadened the application of the judgment bar
to some extent. It tried to make clear, however, that it did not mean to
displace the Bivens action; the new remedies under the FTCA were meant
to supplement, rather than exclude, the right of individuals to pursue consti-
tutional tort claims26 as the Court concluded in Carlson v. Green.27 Finally,
in 1988, Congress expanded the scope of employee immunity from liability
in the Westfall Act but deliberately left constitutional claims outside the
FTCA. Despite Congress’s persistent effort to preserve Bivens,28 the
FTCA’s expanded remedies have been read, in combination with the judg-
ment bar, to exclude Bivens liability in much the way Congress meant to
avoid.29
A variety of factors have contributed to the changing interpretation of
the judgment bar. First, the federal courts have displayed little interest in
understanding the origins and early operation of the judgment bar, prefer-
ring to focus on the text of the statute and its application to modern litiga-
tion.30 Second, modern courts confront a very different litigation landscape.
At the time the judgment bar was adopted, the plaintiff could not routinely
consolidate FTCA litigation against the government and state tort claims
against an employee in a single proceeding.31 The district court lacked sup-
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1974).
26. See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791 (“[T]his
provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic] . . . ”).
27. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
28. Between the years of 1973 and 1983, the Department of Justice made several failed
attempts to convince Congress to preempt the Bivens action by amending the FTCA to provide an
exclusive remedy for constitutional violations. See, e.g., H.R. 10439, 93d Cong. §§ 2–4 (1974); S.
2117, 95th Cong. § 2 (1978); S. 829, 98th Cong. § 2 (1983); H.R. 595, 98th Cong. § 1 (1983).
29. See supra note 13 (collecting cases that apply the judgment bar to Bivens claims raised in
the same suit).
30. See infra Part II.
31. Courts interpret the phrase “by reason of the same subject matter” as incorporating the
modern transactional test into the judgment bar. Thus, modern courts interpret the judgment bar as
precluding claims against government employees where those claims arise out of the same trans-
action as those that gave rise to an FTCA action. E.g., Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 239 (6th
Cir. 1986); see also Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a judgment against
the government under the FTCA precluded a Bivens claim against the tortious government em-
ployee); Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that a claim against
a government employee could not be sustained where plaintiff brought a simultaneous claim
against the government); Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 333–34 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a court’s adjudication of an FTCA claim barred a plaintiff’s claim against a government
employee); Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 962 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that a claim under the
FTCA precludes a victim from bringing a Bivens action against the employee responsible for the
tort); Engle v. Mecke, 24 F.3d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that a decision to bring a claim
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plemental jurisdiction over pendent party claims against the employee, and
the state court could not hear FTCA claims.32
Today, in contrast, Bivens and FTCA claims both arise under federal
law for jurisdictional purposes and often appear in a single proceeding
joined under Rule 2033 on the basis that they grow out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence.34 The existence of a transactional relationship has en-
couraged the courts to treat the Bivens claim as one brought “by reason of
the same subject matter”35 as any claim brought under the FTCA. Third,
federal courts undoubtedly feel obliged to avoid the threat of double recov-
eries seemingly posed by the assertion of overlapping claims under Bivens
and the FTCA (although other tools of coordination could prevent duplica-
tive recovery).36 Finally, the federal courts today display a degree of hostil-
ity towards Bivens claimants that dramatically contrasts with the solicitude
for the rights of individual claimants that informed judicial decisions a half
century ago.
In this three-part article, we explore the issue preclusive origins of the
judgment bar and show why it does not come into play as a device to coor-
dinate Bivens litigation with tort claims under the FTCA. Part I examines
the factors that led to the adoption of the judgment bar and describes its
operation in light of preclusion law and the scope of state and federal judi-
cial authority over the claims in question. Part II examines the sharply dif-
under the FTCA precludes bringing an additional action against employee responsible for the
tort); Arevalo v. Woods, 811 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that a government employee is
“no longer answerable” after judgment entered against government for FTCA claim).
32. See, e.g., Benbow v. Wolf, 217 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1954) (dismissing suit against
government employee because claimant and employee were not diverse); United States v.
Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717, 721–22 (8th Cir. 1952) (stating in dicta that where there is no diversity
of citizenship between claimant and employee, court cannot exercise jurisdiction over employee);
Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690, 690 (D. Mass. 1948) (“I find no language in the Act
whereby the Government consented to be sued along with its employees.”). Cf. Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (refusing to allow pendent party jurisdiction in action brought against
government under FTCA).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 allows permissive joinder of multiple defendants in a single lawsuit if
(1) a right to relief is asserted against each defendant that relates to or arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants arises in
the action. Claimants bring claims under the FTCA against the government and against federal
agents under Bivens in the same action where those claims are related and arise out of the same
transaction. See infra note 34.
34. Modern courts try FTCA and Bivens claims in the same action as a matter of course. See,
e.g., Harris, 422 F.3d at 334; Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1989); Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir. 1978); Serra, 786 F.2d at 241.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006).
36. E.g., Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that the principal
purpose of the judgment bar is to prevent duplicative recoveries); Clifton v. Miller, No. 97-2342,
1998 WL 78992, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998) (declaring that the judgment bar prevents double
recoveries); Kreines v. United States, 959 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We thereby read [the
judgment bar] to preclude dual recover[ies] . . . .”); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1513
(9th Cir. 1991) (similar holding); Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(similar holding).
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ferent conception of the judgment bar that has taken hold in the lower
federal courts and the various factors that help to explain the drift away
from the original operation of the provision. Divorced from its context and
an understanding of the factors that gave rise to its enactment, the text of
the judgment bar produces dysfunctional results. Part III generalizes from
the lessons of the judgment bar. Textualism promises judicial modesty and
deference to Congress; but as the growing power of the judgment bar so
vividly illustrates, textualism can enable the federal courts to achieve results
very much at odds with the expectations of the Congress that adopted the
relevant language. Unless tempered with an appropriately modest assess-
ment of the expectations of the enacting Congress, textualism can facilitate
a kind of judicial immodesty and willfulness quite at odds with the claims
of its most eloquent supporters.
I. THE 1946 JUDGMENT BAR AND THE COORDINATION
OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Although Congress finally adopted the FTCA after a United States
military plane crashed into the Empire State Building,37 the statute had been
in the works for a number of years.38 To understand the Act’s operation and
the role of the judgment bar, we must first understand the broader legal
context in which the FTCA was adopted and the fundamental goals of the
legislation. This part first sketches the origins of the FTCA and then exam-
ines the understood operation of the judgment bar circa 1946.
A. The Adoption of the FTCA
Scholars agree that the FTCA was adopted in part to provide compen-
sation to victims of government wrongdoing and in part to free Congress
from the burden of passing on petitions for private relief.39 Both of these
37. See Mark C. Niles, Nothing But Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope
of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2002).
38. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (“The Federal Tort Claims Act was
passed by the Seventy-Ninth Congress in 1946 . . . after nearly thirty years of congressional
consideration . . . .”).
39. Prior to 1946, persons injured by a government employee had to petition Congress to
pass special, private legislation in order to obtain financial compensation from the government.
Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 393,
397–403 (2010). Such private bills are termed “private claims bills.” Id. at 400. The process of
passing a private claims bill was “slow, cumbersome, and frequently inequitable since identical
claims could receive vastly different treatment by different Congresses.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.2.3, at 635 n.38 (5th ed. 2007) (quoting BASIL J. MEZINES ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6A-6 to -7 (rev. ed. 1986)). Furthermore, Congress was overrun by such
bills. For example, in the Sixty-Eighth Congress, 2200 private claims bills were introduced of
which 250 became law; in the Seventieth Congress, 2268 private claims bills were introduced of
which 336 became law; and in the Seventy-Sixth Congress, 1763 private claims bills were intro-
duced of which 315 became law. Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 49–56 (discussing the burden that
private claims bills imposed on Congress). Congress enacted the FTCA in order to relieve itself of
the burden that such private claims bills imposed and to provide claimants with a just system
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concerns arose from the way the federal government’s sovereign immunity
interacted with the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the master generally bears vicarious liabil-
ity for the torts of the servant, at least those committed within the course
and scope of the servant’s employment.40 In the case of torts committed by
the employees of the federal government, however, the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity prevented the common law rule from coming into play.41
Instead of suing the federal government for the torts of its servants, individ-
uals would sue government officers and employees themselves. In the early
years of the republic, federal officers (including military officials, customs
officers, and tax collectors) found themselves defending personal liability
claims brought by those who alleged a trespassory taking of property.42 The
government often supplied counsel to defend such litigation and would
often indemnify the official in cases where damages were awarded.43 (Gov-
ernment employees had to submit applications for indemnity to Congress in
the form of petitions for private legislation.44) In effect, sovereign immunity
served to place Congress in charge of making the principal-agent determi-
nations that shaped the federal government’s vicarious liability for the tor-
tious acts of its employees. Congress would enact legislation to compensate
victims when it concluded that the employee had acted as the government’s
agent in inflicting the injury.
within which they could pursue their claims against the government. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 2
(1931) (explaining that the private claims process was unjust to claimants); Kent Sinclair &
Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Action Under the FTCA: A Synthesis and Proposal, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5–9 (1991) (explaining the dual purpose of the FTCA); Jeff L. Lewin, The Tail
Wags the Dog: Judicial Misinterpretation of the Punitive Damages Ban in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245, 263–67 (1986) (same).
40. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY §§ 215, 216 cmt. a (1933) (master is liable for the
torts that his servant commits while acting within the scope of his employment); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219.1 (1958) (“A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”).
41. See Figley, supra note 39, at 397–98.
42. See, e.g., Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 138 (1836) (to recover customs tax
from collector); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 749 (1824) (injunction
against trespassory taxation); Meigs v. Mclung’s Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, 11 (1815) (eject-
ment); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 332 (1806) (damages for wrongful seizure of
property to enforce illegal fine).
43. Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dept. of Justice: “It has been found that the Government, through the Department of Justice, is
constantly being called on by the heads of the various agencies to go in and defend, we will say, a
person who is driving a mail truck when suit is brought against him for damages or injuries caused
while he was operating the truck within the scope of his duties. Allegations of negligence are
usually made. It has been found, over long years of experience, that unless the Government is
willing to go in and defend such persons the consequence is a very real attack upon the morale of
the services. Most of these persons are not in a position to stand or defend large damage suits, and
they are of course not generally in a position to secure the kind of insurance which one would if
one were driving for himself.”).
44. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1865 (2010).
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By the 1940s, the scope of federal government activities had grown,
producing a wide range of tort claims and a flood of petitions to Congress
for relief.45 Critics worried about the speed and fairness with which Con-
gress disposed of these claims.46 Congress eventually heard the critics and
chose, through the FTCA, to transfer government tort litigation to the fed-
eral courts as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.47 The
structure of the statute was fairly straightforward: Congress adopted state
law as the measure of liability and simply declared that the federal govern-
ment would be liable for the torts of its employees, acting within the scope
of their office “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.”48 Under the terms of the FTCA, federal courts were to
determine both whether the underlying action was tortious and whether the
action had occurred within the scope of office such that the government was
subject to vicarious or respondeat superior liability. The primary focus of
the FTCA was negligence; the 1946 version of the statute expressly ex-
empted claims based on intentional torts, such as “assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, and deceit.”49
Congress added a variety of procedural wrinkles to the statute in later
years. First, Congress required the injured individual to file a notice of
claim with the relevant agency and permitted suit in federal court only after
the agency denied the claim.50 Second, Congress put in place the Judgment
Fund, a standing appropriation from which judgments up to $100,000 were
to be paid.51 (Congress has since removed the cap, thereby authorizing rou-
tine payment of any judgment rendered by a United States court against the
45. See Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 9 (explaining the private claims bill process).
46. The process of passing a private claims bill was “slow, cumbersome, and frequently
inequitable since identical claims could receive vastly different treatment by different Con-
gresses.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.2.3 (5th ed. 2007) (citing BASIL J.
MEZINES, JACOB A. STEIN & JULES GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-6A § 6A.02 (rev. ed. 1986)).
47. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–22, 60 Stat. 842 (1946)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401–02, 2411–12, 2671–80 (1982));
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 23 (1953) (“The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed by
the Seventy-ninth Congress in 1946 as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 60 Stat.
842, after nearly thirty years of congressional consideration.”).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
49. FTCA § 421(h), 60 Stat. at 846; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006); see also FTCA § 403, 60 Stat. at 843 (providing mechanism
for administrative settlement of claims).
51. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006). In the past, Congress would pass specific appropriations to
fund particular judgments. The Judgment Fund, enacted in 1956, initially established a cap of
$100,000 on payable judgments, and larger claims were payable only through special appropria-
tions. James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amend-
ment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 966 n.241
(1997).
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federal government.52) These terms provided the agency with notice of the
claim and the power to resolve it through compromise or settlement before
litigation. They also ensured routine payment of judgments from the general
treasury (rather than from the agency’s appropriation), thereby eliminating
any Article III finality concerns and further relieving Congress of the bur-
den of making payment decisions on a case-by-case basis.
B. Understanding the Judgment Bar
The judgment bar—and the related settlement or release bar—provide
important protections to federal government employees by foreclosing spe-
cific forms of duplicative litigation.53 In brief, the judgment bar provides
that a judgment in an action under the FTCA shall constitute a “complete
bar” to any action by the claimant “by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to
the claim.”54 It thus bars a claimant from litigating a respondeat superior
claim against the government (as master) and then pursuing the same claim
against the employee (as servant). The release bar operates in much the
same way, declaring that the claimant’s acceptance of a settlement or com-
promise payment from the government shall release both the government
and the “employee . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by
reason of the same subject matter.”55 One can best understand these provi-
sions as relaxing the rules of mutuality in the context of the master’s vicari-
ous liability for the torts of the servant. Claims to which the judgment and
release bars apply—those brought “by reason of the same subject mat-
ter”56—are claims based on common law theories of tort liability to which
the FTCA’s acceptance of respondeat superior liability extends.
One can see the concern with the preclusion of duplicative litigation in
the context of vicarious liability in the remarks of a leading witness. In an
oft-quoted passage from the 1942 hearings on the FTCA, the Assistant At-
torney General, Francis M. Shea, explained the purpose of what later be-
came the judgment and release bars.57 He stated:
52. Congress removed the cap in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-36, 91 Stat. 177 (1977). The statute
thus provides the necessary authorization or appropriation to pay any judgment against the
government.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006) (judgment bar); 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006) (release bar).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2672.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2676; 28 U.S.C. § 2672.
57. Mr. Shea was actually testifying regarding Section 201 of H.R. 6463, which stated “The
acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement shall be final and con-
clusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United
States and against the employee of the Government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim,
by reason of the same subject matter.” Federal Tort Claims Act, H.R. 6463, 77th Cong. § 201, at
790–91 (1942). That provision was included in the 1946 Act without alteration.
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It has been found that the Government, through the Department of
Justice, is constantly being called on by the heads of the various
agencies to go in and defend, we will say, a person who is driving
a mail truck when suit is brought against him for damage or inju-
ries caused while he was operating the truck within the scope of
his duties. Allegations of negligence are usually made. It has been
found, over long years of experience, that unless the Government
is willing to go in and defend such persons the consequence is a
very real attack upon the morale of the services. Most of these
persons are not in a position to stand or defend large damage
suits, and they are of course not generally in a position to secure
the kind of insurance which one would if one were driving
himself.
If the Government has satisfied a claim which is made on
account of a collision between a truck carrying mail and a private
car, that should, in our judgment, be the end of it. After the claim-
ant has obtained satisfaction of his claim from the Government,
either by judgment or by an administrative award, he should not
be able to turn around and sue the driver of the truck. If he could
sue the driver of the truck we would have to go in and defend the
driver in the suit brought against him, and there will thus be con-
tinued a very substantial burden which the Government has had to
bear in conducting the defense of post-office drivers and other
Government employees.58
For Shea, then, the point of the provisions was to protect the employee from
a successive proceeding and the government from the burden of defending
duplicative claims.59 To see why the common law doctrines of claim and
issue preclusion (the tools often used to regulate duplicative litigation) did
not adequately address the government’s concern, we first examine the
judgment bar’s common law foundations and then explore the particulars of
its codification.
58. Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the
United States).
59. Note, however, that the Judgment Bar does not afford an absolute immunity to the federal
employee. It does not prohibit suit against the employee, but instead rather plainly assumes that
the employee will remain a proper defendant in litigation brought by the victims of tortious activ-
ity. One can readily understand Congress’s decision to preserve the possibility of litigation against
the employee. Imagine a situation in which the post-office driver caused an accident while driving
to or from work, or while on personal business during a lunch break. The government might well
contend, in such a case, that it bore no vicarious liability because the employee was not acting
within the scope of employment at the time of the accident. If the government were successful in
asserting such a defense, then the plaintiff could not recover under the FTCA. But the plaintiff
would nonetheless retain the right to pursue a claim against the driver and to recover damages on a
showing of negligence. In some cases, moreover, the plaintiff might even prefer to sue a well-
insured driver instead of the government. Thus, the author of an early article argued that two
features of the FTCA—its cap on attorney’s fees (20% of the recovery) and its prohibition of trial
by jury—would make the prospect of suing a well-insured government employee relatively attrac-
tive. See WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 78–79 (1957).
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1. The Judgment Bar at Common Law
We begin with a brief primer on the law of claim and issue preclusion
and the doctrine of mutuality. Borrowing Shea’s example of respondeat
superior liability, we hypothesize a suit by a pedestrian (Peter) that seeks to
impose vicarious liability on a delivery firm (USPS) on account of the neg-
ligence of a driver (Donna) who struck Peter while driving the company’s
truck.60 If an action brought by Peter against USPS were to result in a ver-
dict of non-negligence, the judgment would obviously preclude Peter from
pursuing further litigation against USPS.61 (That’s claim preclusion.) Under
a strict reading of the mutuality doctrine, however, the USPS exoneration
would not block Peter from bringing a successive claim against Donna. Af-
ter all, Donna and USPS are different parties for preclusion purposes;62 if
Peter did not join Donna as a party to the USPS litigation, he could not rely
on his judgment against USPS as the basis for imposing liability on Donna
(even though a judgment in his favor would necessarily entail a finding of
Donna’s negligence).63 Peter’s inability to bind Donna (a non-party) to the
60. Recall that Mr. Shea’s example involved a claimant successfully pursuing the govern-
ment on a negligence theory under the FTCA and subsequently filing suit against the govern-
ment’s employee whose acts gave rise to first claim. Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of
Francis M. Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
61. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (1942) (“Where a valid and final personal
judgment is rendered on the merits in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot thereafter main-
tain an action on the original cause of action.”).
62. See id. § 83 (declaring a person, not a party, to be bound by a judgment when “in privity”
with the parties). A finding of privity could be based on a variety of different relationships, includ-
ing a relationship of control over the litigation and a relationship of successor in interest to an
owner of real property. See generally id. § 84 (those who control litigation); § 85 (agency rela-
tionship); § 86 (members of a class); §§ 89, 92 (successors in interest and those having derivative
claims). However, government employees are not in privity with the government. Willner v.
Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1034 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Government employees in their individual
capacities are not in privity with their government employer.”); see also 18A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4458, at 567 n.20 (2d ed. 2002). This rule that government employees are not in privity with the
government stems from the common law rule that master and servant are not privies. See, e.g.,
Canin v. Kesse, 28 A.2d 68, 70 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1942) (quoting Wolf v. Kenyon, 242 A.D. 116, 117
(N.Y. App. Div. 1934)) (“Strictly speaking, master and servant are not in privity. . . .”); Sherwood
v. Huber & Huber Motor Exp. Co., 151 S.W.2d 1007, 1012 (Ky. App. 1941) (“ . . . no such privity
relationship exists between principal and agent or master and servant in tort actions growing out of
the sole negligence of the servant.”); Mackey v. Frazier, 106 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1959) (“[W]e
do not hold that a judgment in favor of Sloan Williams, who was the master, operates as res
judicata in a subsequent action against his servant or agent for the reason that the parties are not
the same and there is no such privity between them as is necessary for the application of that
doctrine.”); Deorosan v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 332 P.2d 422, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (“Agents
and principals, including, of course, masters and servants, do not, as such, have any mutual or
successive relationship to rights of property. They are not in privity with each other.”); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Morris, 128 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. App. 1939) (“no privity between a principal and his
agent, or a master and his servant”).
63. On the requirements of preclusion law, and the idea that preclusion applies only to parties
and their privies, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 73, 93, at 332–33, 459–60 (1942)
(declaring judgments binding on parties but not on non-parties, at least in the absence of privity).
The Supreme Court recently signaled its desire to preserve traditional conceptions of party-cen-
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earlier judgment against USPS would mean, from a strict mutuality per-
spective, that Donna could not use an earlier exoneration of USPS as a
defense to Peter’s subsequent claim against her.64
At the time of the FTCA’s adoption in 1946, many state courts contin-
ued to apply the strict doctrine of mutuality, thereby permitting successive
suits by plaintiffs in the position of Peter.65 Indeed, the Restatement of
Judgments, which appeared just four years before the FTCA’s adoption,
confirmed the rules of mutuality.66 The Restatement, however, also recog-
nized a carefully tailored exception (what the Wright and Miller treatise
Federal Practice and Procedure refers to as the “narrow exception”67) for
situations involving vicarious liability. If Peter went to judgment first
against Donna, then that judgment could have a preclusive effect in a later
action against USPS. The Restatement (and many state courts) justified this
departure from mutuality by pointing to the duty of indemnity.68 At com-
mon law, the servant (Donna) would owe a duty to indemnify the master
(USPS) for any vicarious liability imposed on the master on account of the
servant’s negligence.69 (Today, of course, most employers look to liability
insurance carriers for indemnity rather than to their employees.) To protect
the master’s right of indemnity, preclusion law would bar Peter’s suit
against USPS if Donna had first been exonerated in a suit brought by Pe-
ter.70 The idea was to protect the master (or indemnitee) from the subse-
tered preclusion. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 906–07 (2008) (rejecting the notion that an
individual who did not become a party to earlier litigation could be subsequently barred from
pursuing a claim in his own right on a theory of vicarious representation).
64. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) (declaring that a person not a party
or not in privity is not entitled to claim the benefits of an earlier adjudication).
65. See id. (collecting cases); see also Mackey, 106 S.E.2d at 899 (“[W]e do not hold that a
judgment in favor of Sloan Williams, who was the master, operates as res judicata in a subsequent
action against his servant or agent for the reason that the parties are not the same and there is no
such privity between them as is necessary for the application of that doctrine.”).
66. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) (declaring that a person not a party
or a privy “is not bound by or entitled to claim the benefits of any adjudication”).
67. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 62, § 4463, at 681.
68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96 (1942) (defining the preclusive effect of judg-
ments against tortfeasors where a duty of indemnity exists); see also id. § 96 cmts. a, d (specifying
that the rule rests on concern with protecting rights of indemnity and not on a finding of privity
between master and servant).
69. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937) (declaring that a person who, without per-
sonal fault, has become subject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of
another, is entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of
such liability).
70. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1)(a) (1942) (declaring that in an action
by the injured party against the servant, where the master has a right to claim indemnity, a valid
judgment against the injured party “terminates the cause of action against the [master]”). While
the Restatement frames the rule in terms of the interests of indemnitees (employers) and indemni-
tors (employees), the commentary and illustrations make clear that the rule applies to the master-
servant relationship. See id. § 96 cmt. b (declaring the rules applicable to “cases involving master
and servant” where the master “is responsible only upon the ground of respondeat superior”);
§ 96 cmt. d (offering three illustrations of the principle drawn from master-servant litigation). We
have translated the rule into master-servant terms for clarity of exposition.
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quent imposition of liability that could not be shifted back to servant. The
same idea explains why a successful action for damages against the servant
often served as a cap on the amount of any vicarious liability that could
later be imposed on the master.71
While Restatement § 96 recognized that a judgment exonerating the
servant (Donna) would bar a subsequent suit against the master (USPS), the
same result would not obtain if Peter first brought suit against the master.72
According to the Restatement, the entry of judgment in an earlier action by
the injured party against the master has no effect in a subsequent claim
against the servant; it “binds neither the plaintiff nor the [servant].”73 The
Restatement explained that a person (like the servant) who was “not repre-
sented in [the first action] and who does not participate in it, is entitled
to . . . litigate his rights and liabilities.”74 In such a setting, the Restatement
could discern “no reason for an exception to the ordinary rules of mutual-
ity.”75 Mutuality controlled because the servant, as the party primarily lia-
ble, was owed no duty of indemnity and faced no threat of unfairness
through inconsistent results. As a result, the Restatement held that the in-
jured party’s prior litigation with the master bound neither the servant nor
the injured party. Both were free to re-litigate liability and the amount of
damages.76 In short, the Restatement’s rules of preclusion confirmed the
government’s concern: a non-negligence finding in an action against the
government under the FTCA would not, at common law, bar a later negli-
gence claim against the employee.
A similar asymmetry was embedded in Restatement § 99,77 which
specified an affirmative rule of non-mutual preclusion that applied even in
circumstances where the law imposed no obligation of indemnity. Speaking
in terms of a “judgment bar” (and thus providing an obvious precursor to
the provision in the FTCA), Restatement § 99 provided that a
valid judgment on the merits and not based on a personal defense,
in favor of a person charged with the commission of a tort . . .
bars a subsequent action by the plaintiff against another responsi-
ble for the conduct of such person if the action is based solely
71. See id. § 96(1)(b) (providing that a judgment for the victim in a suit against the servant
will bind the victim as to the amount of the recovery in a subsequent action against the master, but
will not bind the master in any respect).
72. See id. § 96(2).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 96(2) cmt. j.
75. Id.
76. Id. (declaring that the judgment in a suit by an injured party against the master does not
bind the injured party either as to result or as to amount in the event the jury awarded a small
judgment); see also id. § 96(2) cmt. j, illus. 9 (illustrating the principle by clarifying that a judg-
ment for the master on the issue of negligence would not bar a subsequent negligence suit against
the servant).
77. Id. § 99.
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upon the existence of a tort . . . by such person, whether or not the
other person has a right of indemnity.78
The commentary explained that the provision, like § 96, addressed a situa-
tion “in which a judgment for the defendant has the effect of barring a claim
against a third person” even though a judgment for the plaintiff would not
bind such third party.79 The Restatement explained that the plaintiff, having
had his “day in court” and having been unsuccessful, would suffer no un-
fairness by being “deprived of an action against another.”80
In articulating an asymmetric rule of judgment bar preclusion,81 the
Restatement charted something of a middle course among the various ap-
proaches taken by the state courts. As noted above, some state courts con-
tinued to adhere to a strict form of mutuality and declined to treat any
exoneration (whether of master or of servant) as a bar to subsequent suit.82
Some courts, however, adopted the Restatement’s position, applying the
judgment bar to protect the master after the servant’s exoneration but refus-
ing to protect the servant.83 Still others extended the logic of the judgment
bar more fully (and further abandoned mutuality), allowing the servant to
invoke the master’s exoneration as a bar to duplicative litigation.84 As Jus-
78. Id. (emphasis supplied).
79. Id. § 99 cmt. a (emphasis supplied).
80. Id.
81. Like those in Restatement of Judgments section 96, the judgment bar provisions in sec-
tion 99 appear consistent with the government’s perception that the rules of preclusion at common
law failed to offer protection to federal employees. Section 99 protected the master from a subse-
quent suit following the exoneration of the servant. But it afforded no protection to the servant if a
judgment of non-negligence were entered in a previous suit brought against the master. This
asymmetric feature (protecting the master but not the servant from duplicative litigation) was
specified in the provision’s application only to a subsequent action against “one responsible for
the conduct” of the prior defendant. Plainly, the master bears “responsibility” for the torts of the
servant but the servant bears no responsibility for the torts of the master. As phrased in the Re-
statement, then, the judgment bar afforded no protection for employees after an exoneration of the
master. Recall that Francis Shea explained the need for a statutory judgment bar precisely to
eliminate this asymmetry; the statute was meant to protect employees from a duplicative suit
following a judgment in litigation against the government.
82. See supra note 65; see also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93.
83. Mackey v. Frazier, 106 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1959) (“[W]e do not hold that a judgment
in favor of Sloan Williams, who was the master, operates as res judicata in a subsequent action
against his servant or agent for the reason that the parties are not the same and there is no such
privity between them as is necessary for the application of that doctrine.”). For the proposition that
the release of the master does not release his servant, see Hamm v. Thompson, 353 P.2d 73, 76
(Colo. 1960) (release of employer does not constitute release of servant).
84. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
127–28 (1912) (“An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been held to exist where the
liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior
suit, upon the same facts when sued by the same plaintiff.”); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust
& Savs. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (“Thus, if a plaintiff sues a servant for injuries
caused by the servant’s alleged negligence within the scope of his employment, a judgment
against the plaintiff on the grounds that the servant was not negligent can be pleaded by the master
as res judicata if he is subsequently sued by the same plaintiff for the same injuries. Conversely, if
the plaintiff first sues the master, a judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that the servant
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 73 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 73 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-MAY-12 16:31
2011] BIVENS, THE JUDGMENT BAR, AND DYNAMIC TEXTUALISM 433
tice Roger Traynor explained in a leading account of the judgment bar, the
key lay in a conclusion that a defendant was exonerated “in an earlier suit
brought by the same plaintiff upon the same facts.”85 Thus, if the plaintiff
first sues the master, “a judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that
the servant was not negligent can be pleaded by the servant as res judicata if
he is subsequently sued by the plaintiff.”86 Traynor acknowledged, in such
a case, that the party asserting the plea (Donna, in our example) was neither
a party to the earlier proceeding (against USPS) nor in privity with that
party (under the accepted definitions of privity).87 Courts based their exten-
sion of the judgment bar on simple justice; having had an opportunity to
prove liability, Peter would not be allowed to “reopen identical issues” by
switching opponents.88
To ensure that the judgment bar did not swallow the rules of privity
and mutuality,89 courts were careful to limit its operation to cases of vicari-
ous or derivative liability.90 Thus, the courts allowed the judgment bar to
was not negligent can be pleaded by the servant as res judicata if he is subsequently sued by the
plaintiff.”); Canin v. Kesse, 28 A.2d 68, 70 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1942) (“Strictly speaking, master and
servant are not in privity, but, where the relationship is undisputed and the action is purely deriva-
tive and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, it constitutes an exception to
the general rule.”); Wolf v. Kenyon, 273 N.Y.S. 170, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (similar hold-
ing); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 2 S.E.2d 570, 573 (N.C. 1939) (“[W]here
it is not claimed that the master actually participated in or directed the commission of the wrong,
and is only sought to be held under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment rendered as in
this case, in favor of the servant, would bar a judgment against the master.” (quoting Childress v.
Lake Erie & W.R. Co., 105 N.E. 467, 469 (Ind. 1914) (“This general rule, however, does not
apply when the relation of master and servant exists between two defendants and there is no claim
that the master actually participated in or directed the commission of the wrong, but is sought to
be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”))); Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 179 N.E.
246, 248 (Mass. 1931) (“[T]he better rule would seem to be that if it is clearly established in the
trial of an action either against the employee or against the principal for damages caused by the
employer’s negligent conduct, that the employee is not negligent, the judgment in the case first
tried is a bar to a subsequent action by the same plaintiff for the same negligent act of the same
employee.”).
85. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Res judicata, as one court explained, did not apply in the vicarious liability context be-
cause the “parties were not the same.” For examples in which the courts referred to the doctrine as
a Judgment bar, see Wolf, 273 N.Y.S. at 172 (under the doctrine, the “prior judgment is a bar” to
subsequent litigation) (emphasis added); Leary, 2 S.E.2d at 573 (“Where it is not claimed that the
master actually participated or directed the commission of the wrong, and is only sought to be held
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment rendered as in this case, in favor of the
servant, would bar a judgment against the master.” (emphasis added)); Giedrewicz, 179 N.E. at
248 (“The better rule would seem to be that if it is clearly established in the trial of an action
either against the employee or against the principal for damages caused by the employer’s negli-
gent conduct, that the employee is not negligent, the judgment in the case first tried is a bar to a
subsequent action by the same plaintiff for the same negligent act of the same employee.”) (em-
phasis added).
90. See, e.g., Canin v. Kesse, 28 A.2d 68, 70 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1942) (“Strictly speaking, master
and servant are not in privity, but, where the relationship is undisputed and the action is purely
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operate in cases of master-servant liability and in cases involving the liabil-
ity of principal-agent and indemnitor-indemnitee.91 This emphasis on deriv-
ative liability limited the judgment bar to situations in which the claims
against the two defendants could be fairly described as “identical.”92 Such
an identity of issues clearly obtained in the context of master-servant litiga-
tion; as one court explained in applying the judgment bar, the master’s lia-
bility “was purely of a derivative or secondary character on the theory of
respondeat superior.”93 This derivative quality would ensure that the exon-
eration of the master (USPS) on the basis of a finding of non-negligence
would apply to the servant as well.94
Two corollaries followed from the requirement of derivative liability
and identity of issues. First, if the theory of liability was not derivative but
was joint and several, the judgment bar had no application.95 In such cases,
the liability of each defendant was based on the conduct of that defendant; a
finding of liability or non-liability as to one defendant would not imply
either the validity or invalidity of the claim against another defendant. The
claims might bear a close resemblance to one another, but the absence of
derivative and dependent upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, it constitutes an exception to
the general rule.”); Wolf, 273 N.Y.S. at 173 (holding resembles that in Canin); Davis v. Perryman,
286 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Ark. 1956) (“[A] holding in favor of the plaintiff in the first action—
whether against the master or the servant—is not res judicata on the questions of negligence and
contributory negligence in a subsequent action, nor does the rule apply as long as the judgment
obtained in the first action remains unsatisfied. It is only when the plaintiff has tried and lost that
the rule applies; and then only where the only questions are negligence and/or contributory negli-
gence.”); Sherwood v. Huber & Huber Motor Exp. Co., 151 S.W.2d 1007, 1011 (Ky. Ct. App.
1941) (“[N]o such privy relationship exists between principal and agent or master and servant in
tort actions growing out of the sole negligence of the servant. Therefore, in this case the instant
defendants, not having been parties to the first action of plaintiff against their servant, either
actually or through privy relationship to their servant, it follows that the judgment rendered
against the latter is not res adjudicata as against them. But the reason for that conclusion is want-
ing where the alleged guilty servant was acquitted in the first action, since in that case the very
foundation of derivative liability of the principal was adjudicated in his favor as well as that of his
servant in the action against the latter alone, and to which action the injured plaintiff was a
party.”); see generally Bigelow v. Old Dominion, 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912) (describing a princi-
ple of “ . . . general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual”).
91. Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 128; Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l. Trust & Savs. Ass’n, 122 P.2d
892, 895 (Cal. 1942).
92. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895; see also Davis, 286 S.W.2d at 845 (applying judgment bar to
block suit against servant for the “same mishap” where it was conceded in the first suit that the
servant was at all times acting within the scope of employment); Canin, 28 A.2d at 69 (applying
judgment bar to block suit against servant following an exoneration of the master “for the same
negligent act”); Wolf, 273 N.Y.S. at 172 (applying judgment bar after exoneration of the master
“upon the same facts when sued by the same plaintiff”).
93. See Canin, 28 A.2d at 70; see also Wolf, 273 N.Y.S. at 173; Lasher v. McAdam, 211
N.Y.S. 395, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1925) (barring suit against servant after jury rendered verdict in
favor of master and where master’s liability was purely of a derivative character).
94. See supra note 84.
95. See Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 128 (holding that where the liability of two tortfeasors is joint
and several, the exoneration of one is no bar to a suit against the other even if upon the same
facts); Wolf, 273 N.Y.S. at 171 (explaining that a subsequent suit against the servant would not be
barred if the master and servant were joint tort-feasors).
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derivative liability meant that the courts would continue to apply the doc-
trine of mutuality and would not treat one party’s exoneration as the basis
for barring a later suit against a joint tortfeasor.96
A second corollary flowed from the requirements of derivative liability
and an identical set of issues. If the exoneration in Peter’s first proceeding
against USPS was based on considerations other than a finding of Donna’s
non-liability, then Donna could not invoke the judgment bar to block a suc-
cessive claim by Peter.97 Exonerations that failed to trigger the judgment
bar could occur in a number of situations in the first suit against USPS. For
example, USPS might win exoneration on a finding that Donna’s conduct,
though tortious, did not occur in the course and scope of employment, thus
rendering the doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable. Similarly, the
USPS exoneration may have been based on a finding that Donna’s conduct
was intentional or malicious, thereby precluding vicarious liability in some
jurisdictions.98 Either form of exoneration would not establish Donna’s
non-liability; both would leave Donna subject to suit for any injuries her
tortious conduct may have caused. Restatement § 99 captured this limita-
tion in part by declaring the judgment bar inapplicable when the first exon-
eration was based upon a defense personal to the master.99 A judgment that
rested upon such personal defenses would not necessarily negate any claim
against the party secondarily responsible.
In some jurisdictions that had relaxed the mutuality rule, the judgment
and release bars were also triggered in cases where the plaintiff (Peter) was
successful in the first proceeding against the master (USPS) and secured a
judgment of negligence. There were, however, differing views about how
the doctrine applied in that setting. In some jurisdictions, the courts im-
posed a kind of election of remedies; if Peter obtained a judgment against
96. Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 128.
97. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 532 (9th ed. 1965); Note, The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 56 Yale L.J. 534, 559 (1947) (citing Gould v. Evansville & C.R.R., 91 U.S. 526
(1875)) (explaining that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “cannot be res judicata
of the issues involved in the action”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96 cmt. g (1942)
(“Defense personal to indemnitor. The rule . . . by which normally when judgment is rendered
against the claimant in favor of the indemnitor the indemnitee would be discharged from liability,
does not operate to discharge the indemnitee from liability where the judgment was given for the
indemnitor on grounds which were personal to him and which could not have been taken advan-
tage of by the indemnitee in an action against him. Thus, where judgment is given in favor of the
indemnitor because of a personal immunity, as where the indemnitor was the husband of the
injured person, or where judgment was rendered in his favor because of a statute of limitations,
which would not apply to an action against the indemnitee, the judgment does not bar the subse-
quent action against the indemnitee.”); id. § 99 (holding similarly); see also Israel v. Wood Dol-
son Co., 134 N.E.2d 97, 99 (N.Y. 1956) (stating the rule that in cases involving the master-servant
relationship, if the first case was brought against either master or servant, and that case was dis-
missed on grounds personal to the defendant, the claimant is not barred from pursuing the other in
a subsequent suit).
98. Of course, Peter might attempt to show that USPS engaged in independent misconduct in
hiring a driver with a known tendency toward intentional misconduct.
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (language of Restatement provided in text).
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USPS that alone was enough to foreclose suit against Donna.100 In other
states, by contrast, the judgment bar came into effect for the benefit of
Donna only when the master satisfied Peter’s judgment.101 As the Ohio
Supreme Court explained:
The plaintiff has a right of action against either the master or the
servant, or against both, in separate actions, as a judgment against
one is no bar to an action or judgment against the other until one
judgment is satisfied. . . . The plaintiff, in any event, can have but
one satisfaction of his claim.102
This emphasis on the importance of satisfaction to the application of the
judgment bar also influenced the operation of the release bar. Some states
would treat any settlement by a plaintiff with the master (USPS) as a release
of the claim against the servant (Donna).103 As the Ohio Supreme Court
explained, however, a partial settlement would not constitute full satisfac-
tion and should not operate to bar suit against the servant.104 Suit was thus
allowed against the servant with the condition that the amount paid in set-
tlement by the master would reduce any judgment against the servant.105
100. See McNamara v. Chapman, 123 A. 229, 233 (N.H. 1923); Betcher v. McChesney, 100
A. 124, 125 (Pa. 1917) (“[T]he party may sue either master or servant, the one for actual negli-
gence, the other for imputed negligence; but it by no means follows that, if he sue the one and
obtain judgment, he can afterwards sue the other . . . .”).
101. See, e.g., Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705, 705 (Ohio 1940) (“Where a liability arises
against both a master and his servant in favor of a party injured by the sole negligence of the latter
while acting for the master, such injured party may sue either the servant, primarily liable, or the
master, secondarily liable, or both, in separate actions, as a judgment in his favor against one, until
satisfied, is no bar to an action against the other, the injured party being entitled to full satisfaction
from either the master or servant or from both.”); Hart v. Guardian Trust Co., 75 N.E.2d 570, 583
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1945) (“For the wrong of a servant acting within the scope of his authority, the
plaintiff has a right of action against either the master or the servant, or against both, in separate
actions, as a judgment against one is no bar to an action or judgment against the other until one
judgment is satisfied.”); Huey v. Dykes, 82 So. 481, 482 (Ala. 1919) (explaining that satisfaction
of judgment by master or servant will bar subsequent action against the other); O’Briant v. Pryor,
195 S.W. 759, 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917) (“Where, for example, a master is liable for the tort of his
servant, a satisfaction from one discharges both . . . .”).
102. Losito, 24 N.E.2d at 707.
103. Many courts held that where the liability of the master was predicated solely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior, a valid release of either the master or the servant would release
the other. E.g., Chapin v. Chicago & E.I.R. Co., 18 Ill. App. 47, 50 (1885) (“When, for example, a
master is liable for the tort of his servant, a satisfaction from one discharges both, though they can
not be sued jointly. If it were not so, a party having a claim against several persons on account of a
single tort might sue one and settle the suit, receiving damages; he might then sue another and
settle in the same way, and repeat the proceeding as to all but one, and then sue him and recover
the whole damage, as if nothing had been paid by the others.”); Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1, 3
(Mo. 1961) (“A valid release of a servant from liability for tort operates to release the master . . .
likewise release of the master releases the servant . . . .”); McLaughlin v. Siegel, 185 S.E. 873, 874
(Va. 1936) (satisfaction by master of judgment against both held to release servant as well).
104. Losito, 24 N.E.2d at 708 (“[A] partial settlement with the master does not amount to an
adjudication of the whole claim, as does a suit carried to judgment, and, therefore, such settlement
cannot be claimed as a bar in this case. The settlement can only be a pro tanto satisfaction of the
claim.”).
105. Id.; Miller v. Beck, 79 N.W. 344, 345 (Iowa 1899).
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The doctrine of subrogation, applicable in some jurisdictions, compli-
cated the operation of the release bar. At common law, the liability of the
servant was viewed as primary and that of the master as secondary or deriv-
ative. Although the plaintiff (Peter) might sue USPS and collect full satis-
faction, courts often took the position that the loss should ultimately fall on
the primarily negligent party (Donna). As a result, when USPS satisfied a
judgment in favor of Peter, it was subrogated to Peter’s rights and entitled
to seek indemnity from Donna.106 (To be sure, as employers purchased in-
surance, they would tend to look to the insurance company to defray tort
liability rather than calling on their relatively impecunious employees to
repay the loss.) This conception of the master’s liability as secondary intro-
duced an asymmetry into the operation of the release bar. Courts in subro-
gation jurisdictions held that a settlement with the servant would exonerate
the master.107 The purpose of this broader version of the release bar was to
protect the master’s right to seek reimbursement for any amounts paid to
the victim. (The plaintiff’s release of the servant would prevent the master
from suing the servant as subrogee of the plaintiff’s claim.) As a result, it
was possible in some jurisdictions that a settlement with the master would
not release the servant, but a settlement with the servant would release the
master.
One final provision of the Restatement deserves notice as part of the
backdrop to the codification of the judgment bar. As a general matter and as
Francis Shea remarked, the government would often defend employees
sued for negligent acts committed in the scope of their employment even
though the government had no obligation to pay the damages on behalf of
such employees.108 Following the FTCA’s adoption, the government’s
practice of controlling the defense of suits brought against employees posed
a threat of non-party preclusion against the government. In keeping with the
common law, Restatement § 84 provided that the master who assumes con-
trol of the servant’s defense can be bound by an unfavorable judgment in
that proceeding.109 Section 84 states the rule as follows:
A person who is not a party but who controls an action . . . is
bound by the adjudications . . . as if he were a party if he has a
proprietary or financial interest in the judgment or in the determi-
nation of a question of fact or of a question of law with reference
to the same subject matter or transaction.110
106. See generally Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358 (1858); Chicago City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. 418
(1862).
107. Losito, 24 N.E.2d at 707.
108. Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dept. of Justice).
109. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942).
110. Id.
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While the government would face no direct liability on any judgment en-
tered against the servant, it would (post–FTCA) clearly qualify as a party
with a financial interest in the determination of a question of fact or law in
that proceeding.111 (Exoneration of the servant on a finding of non-negli-
gence would protect the government from any claim of vicarious liability
under the FTCA; as we have seen, under Restatement sections 96 and 99,
such a judgment would bar a subsequent negligence claim against the gov-
ernment.)112 Such a financial stake set the stage for the conclusion that an
unfavorable judgment in litigation against an employee, if conducted under
the government’s control, could foreclose the government from re-litigating
an earlier finding that the employee was negligent.
While the threat of preclusion was quite real, section 84’s reference to
the “same subject matter” limited the scope of preclusive effect of the first
judgment—language that was later incorporated into the judgment bar it-
self. Commentary accompanying the provision clarified that a judgment
against the servant could preclude the master on the issue of negligence.113
Nevertheless, how broadly would the preclusive effect extend? The “same
subject matter” language served to limit the preclusive effect of the earlier
judgment; that judgment did not operate to foreclose the master from con-
testing liability altogether but only from re-litigating the specific issue of
negligence that had been previously resolved. The use of the “same subject
matter” formulation thus invited an analysis of the earlier judgment to de-
termine what had been decided and what could fairly be given preclusive
effect in the subsequent action.114 As the next section explores in more
111. The government only waived sovereign immunity for claims brought against it under the
FTCA in federal court. Thus, the government could not be bound by a judgment in a personal
capacity suit against an employee, even if it controlled the defense of that suit, until the claimant
elected to bring suit against the government under the FTCA.
112. Recall that masters can invoke a judgment exonerating the servant, at least on the same
subject matter, as a bar to vicarious liability litigation against the master. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96, 99 (1942). The goal of securing a preclusive exoneration would
clearly satisfy the financial interest test of Restatement section 84. Id. § 84. In explaining the
scope of this rule of preclusion by control, the Restatement’s account specifically included situa-
tions in which the master bears derivative liability for the torts of a servant and thus appears to
threaten the government with preclusion under the FTCA. See id. § 84 cmt. c (“The rule also
applies to one who participates in an action because an issue in the action is the tortious quality of
an act on which his liability or freedom from liability depends . . . .”); see also id. § 84 cmt. c,
illus. 9. (illustrating that if Peter sues Donna, and USPS assumes control, then “in a subsequent
suit by [Peter] against [USPS] based on a claim that [Donna] was acting in the scope of employ-
ment, the prior judgment concludes [USPS] upon the question of [Donna]’s negligence.”).
113. Id.
114. Restatement of Judgments section 70 confirms that the “same subject matter” test was
meant to limit the scope of preclusive effect quite narrowly rather than to preclude all related
claims. Id. § 70. Section 70 provides that legal determinations made in litigation between the
parties are not conclusive “in a subsequent action on a different cause of action, except where both
causes of action arose out of the same subject matter or transaction . . . .” Id. In explaining the
construct, comment b defines the same subject matter quite narrowly to apply to successive breach
of contract claims on a single contract, or successive suits for installments of interest under a
contract or rental payments due under a lease. Id. § 70 cmt. b. At the time, these were regarded
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detail, it appears that the drafters of the FTCA introduced the “same subject
matter” language into the judgment bar to achieve a similarly narrow defini-
tion of the non-mutual preclusive effect of judgments in favor of the
government.
2. The Judgment Bar as Codified
As the discussion of common law developments made clear, the judg-
ment bar was framed against the backdrop of a rich body of preclusion law.
To summarize briefly by returning to our illustrative case, the law provided
that Peter as the victim of a servant’s negligence was free to sue the servant
(Donna), the master (USPS), or both. (Of course, if Peter recovered judg-
ments against both defendants, he could recover but a single satisfaction of
the amount of his claim.) If Peter sued Donna, a finding of non-negligence
would ordinarily bar a subsequent suit against USPS based on a claim of
vicarious liability. (In such a case, the exoneration of Donna would negate
the claim of negligence at the center of the vicarious liability proceeding.)
In addition, if USPS controlled the action against Donna, then a judgment
imposing liability on Donna for negligence would bind USPS in a subse-
quent vicarious liability action, at least with respect to the negligence deter-
mination itself. If Peter first brought suit against USPS, by contrast, the
judgment might not have had much impact on subsequent litigation against
Donna. According to the Restatement and the many state courts that ad-
hered to mutuality, both Peter and Donna were free to re-litigate issues of
liability, and neither one could rely on the prior adjudication against USPS.
Still, in a few states (like California) that had gone further in abandoning
mutuality, a judgment of non-negligence in an action against USPS could
bar a subsequent negligence claim against Donna.
The judgment bar115 seeks to codify this last element of the law of
preclusion, treating a judgment in litigation with the government under the
FTCA as a complete bar to any action against the employee “by reason of
the same subject matter.”116 While the judgment bar goes beyond the com-
mon law in some respects, the comments of Francis Shea and the language
and structure of the statute confirm that it meant to track the common law in
different causes of action because they arose from separate breaches of duty, but they were none-
theless subject to preclusion because the legal question at the heart of the two claims was other-
wise identical.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006). The original Judgment Bar was substantially similar to the
modern Judgment Bar. It provided: “The judgment in such action shall constitute a complete bar
to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the
government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” Law of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753,
§ 410(b), 60 Stat. 844 (1946).
116. Recall that Mr. Shea testified that the purpose of the judgment and release bars was to
prevent a claimant from pursuing the government to judgment on a negligence theory under the
FTCA and subsequently filing suit against the government’s employee on the same theory. Tort
Claims, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Francis M. Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of
Justice).
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imposing a limited restriction on duplicative litigation (and a modest relaxa-
tion of the mutuality rule) following an initial suit against the government
on a theory of respondeat superior.117 For starters, the statute tracks the
common law and Restatement of Judgments in treating the entry of a judg-
ment as a bar to suit against a non-party to the litigation.118 The statutory
bar, however, comes into play only in a limited set of circumstances: where
a judgment has been entered in an action “under the” FTCA and where the
subsequent claim arose from the “same act or omission” that had previously
resulted in a judgment.119 These features of the statute narrow the universe
of subsequent claims that might be barred, making it clear that any candi-
date claim for preclusion must have arisen from the same set of circum-
stances (the “act or omission”) that gave rise to the claim against the
government.
With a transactional connection between the initial claim against the
government and the subsequent claim against the employee ensured by
other language in the statute, the limiting reference to actions brought “by
reason of the same subject matter” must be doing something more than
simply giving voice to a (redundant) requirement of transactional connec-
117. A contemporaneous student note writer clearly understood the limited operation of the
judgment bar. See Note, Government Recovery of Indemnity from Negligent Employees: A New
Federal Policy, 63 Yale L.J. 570 (1954). Thus, the author explained that “This section alters the
common law rule that a claimant may obtain judgment against all persons liable for the same tort.”
Id. at 575 n.30 (citing PROSSER, TORTS 1106 (1941); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93
cmt. b (1942)). The author explained the switch by noting that the government provided an assur-
ance of satisfaction, thus justifying a departure from the common law. The author anticipated and
rejected the possibility that the judgment bar might be interpreted to block suits against an em-
ployee, even though the exoneration of the government did not bear on the employee’s liability.
Although one could argue that “the section would preclude an action against the employee when-
ever any prior suit against the Government reaches judgment,” the author rejected this result as
“palpably unfair where judgment is rendered for the Government on the grounds that the em-
ployee acted outside the scope of his employment.” Id. In such case the claimant would be de-
prived of his remedy against the negligent employee “merely because he mistakenly attempted to
avail himself of his statutory remedy.” Id.
118. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
127–28 (1912) (“An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been held to exist where the
liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior
suit, upon the same facts when sued by the same plaintiff.”); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust
& Savs. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (“Thus, if a plaintiff sues a servant for injuries
caused by the servant’s alleged negligence within the scope of his employment, a judgment
against the plaintiff on the grounds that the servant was not negligent can be pleaded by the master
as res judicata if he is subsequently sued by the same plaintiff for the same injuries. Conversely, if
the plaintiff first sues the master, a judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that the servant
was not negligent can be pleaded by the master as res judicata if he is subsequently sued by the
same plaintiff for the same injuries.”); Canin v. Kesse, 28 A.2d 68, 70 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1942)
(“Strictly speaking, master and servant are not in privity, but, where the relationship is undisputed
and the action is purely derivative and dependent upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, it
constitutes an exception to the general rule.”); Wolf v. Kenyon, 273 N.Y.S. 170, 174 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1934) (holding similarly).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
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tion.120 Viewed against the backdrop of the Restatement and the common
law development of the judgment bar, the purpose of the limiting reference
seems quite clear. Rather than a flat bar on subsequent suits against an em-
ployee, the judgment bar meant to foreclose only those suits that were nec-
essarily defeated by the findings embedded in the prior judgment.121 When
the government secured a judgment on the basis of non-negligence and the
claimant brought a subsequent action for negligence against the employee,
the second claim was barred as one brought by reason of the same subject
matter. Both the relevant facts and the theory of liability were identical (as
required in common law applications of the judgment bar).122 When the
judgment rested on other considerations (such as a finding that the conduct
at issue did not occur within the scope of employment or that the conduct,
though tortious, was not within the government’s waiver of sovereign im-
munity), the judgment was to have no preclusive effect on a subsequent
action against the employee.123 When the prior judgment did not negate the
employee’s liability, the subsequent action was not brought “by reason of
the same subject matter” that had led to the denial of government liability
under the FTCA. In other words, the judgment bar codifies what Wright
and Miller refer to as non-mutual issue preclusion.124 (The mistake of mod-
120. The judgment bar provides: “The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title
shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2676. Absent the phrase “by reason of the same subject matter,” the judgment bar would bar any
subsequent claim against the employee that arose out of the same act or omission that gave rise to
the FTCA claim that was pursued against the government. Id. The inclusion of the phrase “by
reason of the same subject matter” indicates that Congress intended to narrow the scope of the
judgment bar. Id.
121. Congressional testimony discussing the judgment bar indicates that Congress anticipated
that the judgment bar would only bar subsequent claims that were functionally equivalent to
claims that had been tried to judgment against the government under the FTCA. Tort Claims,
supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the judgment bar and stating “Judgment in a tort action constitutes
a bar to further action upon the same claim, not only against the Government (as would have been
true [in the absence of the judgment bar]), but also against the delinquent employee . . . .”)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 32 (“Under the present bill, the judgment rendered will constitute
a bar to further action upon the same claim not only against the Government but also against the
employee.”) (emphasis added).
122. Of course, if in a suit against the government under the FTCA, the plaintiff were to lose
after a finding of non-negligence on the merits, such a judgment would bar a subsequent claim
against the employee for intentional misconduct. Only when the judgment for the government
fails to negate the employee’s liability (such as a judgment for the government on the basis that
the employee’s intentional tort was excluded from the statute’s coverage) would a subsequent
claim against the employee arise from a different subject matter and escape the preclusive effect
of the judgment bar.
123. The common law rules of preclusion provided that a non-merits based disposition would
not bar a subsequent suit by the claimant against either the master or the servant. See Israel v.
Wood Dolson Co., 134 N.E.2d 97 (N.Y. 1956) (discussing rule that where exoneration is based on
non-merits based disposition, no preclusive effect attaches).
124. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 62, at § 4464.
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ern courts lies in their treatment of the FTCA as a form of non-mutual claim
preclusion.)125
Other superficially puzzling features of the judgment bar make sense
when viewed against the backdrop of the common law model of non-mutual
issue preclusion that it was meant to implement. First, some might wonder
why the judgment bar operates asymmetrically, barring subsequent suits
against federal employees after litigation with the government but failing to
address the preclusive implications of initial litigation with an employee.
The common law background makes clear that the statutory judgment bar
was not meant to set out a detailed code but only to add a single rule of
preclusion to a series of common law rules that were otherwise left undis-
turbed. As we have seen, the common law ensured that a judgment exoner-
ating the servant would bar a subsequent action against the master as to the
same subject matter.126 Moreover, the common law treated a successful ac-
tion against the servant as binding on the government, at least when the
government controlled the litigation.127 If we accept those results as given,
then the judgment bar, far from imposing an asymmetric result, operates to
furnish a symmetry that had eluded the Restatement.
The statute’s (arguably asymmetric) failure to address the preclusive
effect of a judgment against an employee may also reflect Congress’s deter-
mination that the preclusive effect of a state judgment (in private tort litiga-
tion against a federal employee) was properly governed by the law of the
state that rendered the judgment.128 In fashioning the judgment bar, Con-
125. The essential difference between non-mutual issue preclusion and non-mutual claim pre-
clusion is that non-mutual claim preclusion allows a party to bar a litigant from bringing claims
that were never raised (but that could have been raised) in a previous suit, whereas the effect of
non-mutual issue preclusion is limited to issues that were actually litigated in a previous suit. Id.
§ 4464.1. The only cogent argument in favor of non-mutual claim preclusion is that the party to be
precluded should have joined his new adversary in the original litigation. Id. This argument in
favor of the application of non-mutual claim preclusion carries no weight with regards to the
FTCA as it stood in 1946 because a litigant could not always join a government employee in the
same suit as the government. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
126. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1)(a) (1942) (discussing exoneration of
servant exonerating master).
127. As Francis Shea’s comments indicate, the government made a consistent practice of con-
trolling the defense of federal employees in personal capacity suits. For the proposition that a
successful action against the government was binding on the government where the government
controlled the litigation, see supra notes 108–11.
128. Federal courts apply state preclusion law to determine the preclusive effect of a prior
state court adjudication on a subsequent FTCA case despite the FTCA’s requirement that all ac-
tions under the FTCA be tried by the court and not a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2006); In re Byard,
47 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. Tenn. 1985) (“For example, in cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act
. . . federal courts have generally looked to state law principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in determining the preclusive effect of a prior state court decision in a subsequent federal
case.”); see also Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1323 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana
preclusion law to estop claimant from re-litigating contributory negligence finding of federal FAA
administrative law judge in subsequent FTCA suit); Falk v. United States, 375 F.2d 561, 564 (6th
Cir. 1967) (applying Ohio preclusion law to hold that claimant was not barred from pursuing
similar claim under FTCA after state court judgment because FTCA claim involved different
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gress plainly envisioned two rounds of litigation: an initial proceeding
against the federal government in federal court129 and a second proceeding
against the employee in state court.130 Because the FTCA made state law
the measure of the federal government’s liability, Congress had every rea-
son to expect that (in the absence of codification) state law would control
the preclusive effect of the federal judgment on the later proceeding against
the employee.131 To ensure against the sort of duplicative litigation it
feared, Congress had to specify a statutory judgment bar rule for application
in the subsequent state court proceeding. Otherwise, if the initial FTCA
judgment was entered in a state that continued to adhere to full mutuality or
to the Restatement’s approach, state preclusion law would afford little pro-
tection to the employee.132 When, by contrast, the first action was brought
against the employee in state court on a state law claim, Congress may not
have identified a strong federal interest that would warrant the specification
of a federal preclusion rule.133 Having declined to federalize the negligence
claimants and different theory of liability); Filice v. United States, 271 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir.
1959) (applying California preclusion law to bar claimant from re-litigating identical suit against
the United States under the FTCA where previous suit arose under the FTCA); Maryland v. Capi-
tal Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 302–05 (D. Md. 1967) (applying Maryland preclusion law to
estop the United States from defending against a negligence suit under the FTCA where different
claimants successfully litigated similar negligence suit in the District of Columbia under the
FTCA); D’Ambra v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180, 1181–82 (D.R.I. 1973) (applying Rhode
Island preclusion law to estop the United States from defending against negligence suit where
same court found United States liable in previous FTCA suit involving different claimant); Bagge
v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 809, 810–11 (D. Cal. 1965) (holding that the claimant is estopped
from re-litigating negligence claim in indemnity action against the United States where California
jury already conclusively determined that claimant was negligent and that the United States was
not the sole proximate cause of the underlying plaintiff’s injuries).
129. Congress assumed that all litigation against the federal government would proceed in
federal court; indeed, it conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the district courts and thus foreclosed
state court adjudication of such claims.
130. Congress assumed that any subsequent (or prior) action against a government employee
would proceed in state court (at least in the absence of diversity). After all, the existing rules of
supplemental jurisdiction did not allow the plaintiff (Peter) to add a pendent claim (against
Donna) to its claim against the government under the FTCA. While the government could remove
the state court action against a federal employee, the plaintiff could not bring such a suit in federal
court in the first instance.
131. Under rules of inter-jurisdictional preclusion today, state courts owe an obligation rooted
in federal common law to respect judgments of the federal court. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lock-
heed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–08 (2001). But at the time of the FTCA adoption, under the
regime of Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130 (1874), state courts were expected to assess the
preclusive effect of federal judgments, rendered by federal courts sitting in diversity, by reference
to the law of the state in which the district court sat.
132. See Filice, 271 F.2d at 783 (defining the preclusive effect of a federal judgment in an
action brought under the FTCA by reference to the law of the state, California, in which the events
occurred); D’Ambra, 396 F. Supp. at 1181–82 (applying Rhode Island preclusion law in subse-
quent FTCA suit where original suit was brought under FTCA).
133. Recall that the FTCA was passed with goals in mind: to reduce the burdens that private
claims bills were inflicting upon Congress, and to ensure that claimants had a just and efficient
mechanism for seeking compensation for torts committed by government employees. See supra
note 33. Congress was aware that because government employees are often under-insured or judg-
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claim against the employee, Congress could have reasonably decided to
leave the preclusive effect of a state court judgment to state law as well.134
In a second puzzling feature, the statutory bar applies to any judgment
entered in litigation with the government, including both judgments for the
government and judgments for the plaintiff. This application to judgments
of all kinds represents a departure from common law; Restatement section
99, for example, treated a judgment as a bar to further litigation only when
it exonerated the defendant from liability.135 Other aspects of the common
law scheme, however, ascribed some preclusive effect to judgments in
favor of the plaintiff; thus, when a plaintiff recovered a judgment against a
servant under Restatement section 96, the principle of indemnity barred the
plaintiff from obtaining a more substantial judgment against the master (at
least with respect to the same subject matter).136 Modest success in initial
litigation could thus impinge on the plaintiff’s right to pursue a larger judg-
ment against another defendant. The statutory judgment bar essentially du-
plicated this result by declaring that a successful action against the
government would bar subsequent litigation against the employee. The stat-
ute clearly assumed that the government would pay the judgment, thus
guaranteeing the plaintiff full satisfaction of the claim.137 So long as the
judgment involved the “same subject matter” as the suit against the em-
ployee, the statute could fairly bar recovery on the theory that the plaintiff
had obtained full satisfaction of the claim.
One final omission from the statute bears mention. The release bar
addresses the consequences of a settlement with the federal government,
declaring that such settlements preclude a subsequent suit against the em-
ployee whose conduct gave rise to the claim.138 The statute, however, does
not specify the preclusive consequences of settlement with an employee for
future litigation with the federal government. At the time of the FTCA’s
adoption as noted above, some states were treating such settlements as
preclusive in order to protect the master’s right as subrogee/indemnitor to
ment proof, government employees would rarely satisfy judgments rendered against them. Tort
Claims, supra note 3, at 9, 31. Thus, perhaps Congress elected to give the judgment bar a unidi-
rectional application so as to ensure that claimants could pursue the government in the event that a
government employee could not satisfy a judgment rendered against it in the first instance.
134. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, federal courts must give effect to the judgments
of state courts and state law ordinarily provides the measure of the preclusive effect of such
judgments. See Sentek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
135. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (1942).
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (1982) (collecting authority); RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1)(b) (1942) (providing that a judgment for the victim in a suit
against the servant will bind the victim as to the amount of the recovery in a subsequent action
against the master).
137. Mr. Shea’s testimony indicates that Congress assumed that the government would satisfy
any judgment rendered against it under the FTCA. Tort Claims, supra note 3, at 9.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006).
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seek indemnity from the employee.139 Congress, however, did not address
either the subrogation/indemnity rights of the federal government or the im-
plications of any such right on the preclusive effect of a settlement with an
employee. Reflecting on these omissions, the Supreme Court ruled in 1954
that it would decline to recognize an implied right for the federal govern-
ment to seek indemnity (as subrogee) from the employee whose negligence
resulted in the imposition of liability under the FTCA.140 Without a right of
subrogation/indemnity to protect, there was little reason for Congress to
treat a settlement with the employee as preclusive (especially when there
was a possibility that the judgment might go unsatisfied). Once again, the
preclusive consequences were left to state law.141
3. The Judgment Bar in Operation
During the fifteen years that followed the FTCA’s adoption, the rules
of preclusion in general and the judgment bar in particular operated, as
sketched above, to coordinate litigation of negligence claims against the
federal government and its employees. To begin with, the judgment bar left
common law claim preclusion in place to coordinate routine problems of
duplicative litigation. Thus, when a plaintiff first secured a judgment
against the government for $15,000 and then sought an additional sum from
the government as compensation for injuries that had later manifested them-
selves, the court had no reason to cite the judgment bar and its relaxation of
mutuality because both lawsuits named the government.142 Accordingly, the
court simply held that the state law of preclusion, which was thought to
govern the preclusive effect of the first FTCA judgment against the federal
government, treated all claims as merged in the first judgment and, thus,
barred the second action.143
A variety of sources confirm the presumptive viability of suit against
the employee in the wake of a judgment for the government. Thus, in John-
ston v. Earle,144 the plaintiff first sued the government to challenge an ac-
tion by agents of the IRS in forfeiting his tractor to pay a tax
139. See supra notes 103–08 (discussing release bar).
140. See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) (refusing to allow the government to
collect indemnity from employees absent legislative approval).
141. On the failure of the FTCA to preserve a duty of indemnity running from the federal
employee to the government, see Collins v. United States, 564 F.3d 833, 835–36 (7th Cir. 2009).
142. See Filice v. United States, 271 F.2d 782, 783–84 (9th Cir. 1959) (concluding that res
judicata principles in California bar the plaintiff, who recovered a judgment against the United
States for $15,000, from bringing a second suit against the United States claiming that the dam-
ages were inadequate).
143. Id. at 783; see also Jones v. United States, 228 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (following
dismissal of initial claim to challenge government’s failure to provide accurate geological infor-
mation, court holds that res judicata bars a second such claim without referring to the judgment
bar).
144. 162 F. Supp. 149 (D. Or. 1958).
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delinquency.145 The court dismissed the action under the FTCA’s forfeiture
exemption.146 Next, the plaintiff sued the agents themselves.147 In a series
of procedural moves that anticipate its posture in Bivens, the government
successfully moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim against the
agents did not arise under federal law.148 When the plaintiff re-filed in state
court, the government removed and argued that the judgment bar or the
doctrine of claim preclusion barred the action.149 The district court sensibly
concluded that the prior adjudication of the claim against the government
under the FTCA had no preclusive effect on the action against the employ-
ees. The earlier disposition, according to the court, was based on a finding
that the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to the
claims in question; such a disposition “was not a judgment in bar or on the
merits.”150 In other words, the court found that the judgment would have no
preclusive effect either under the judgment bar itself or under the common
law doctrine of claim preclusion (that governed the preclusive effect of a
merits disposition to which the judgment bar did not apply).
Other authorities agreed that a judgment for the government would bar
subsequent litigation against the employee only when it negated the em-
ployee’s liability.151 Well-advised attorneys thus had an obvious incentive
to anticipate the possible non-scope or other rulings in favor of the govern-
ment by bringing actions against employees, if only to address the time-bar
problems that might result from excessive delay. To deal with the problems
of coordination presented, the federal courts developed a set of interesting
techniques. Everyone agreed, apparently, that the plaintiff could not pursue
claims against both the government and the employee in a single proceed-
ing. Rules of joinder and supplemental jurisdiction did not permit such an
expansive assertion of jurisdiction.152 As it did in Johnston, however, the
145. Id. at 151.
146. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (2006).
147. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. at 151.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 153.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Ziarno, 170 F. Supp. 197, 200 (N.D.N.Y. 1959) (con-
firming viability of suit against government employee following an exoneration of the government
on grounds that employee was acting outside the scope of his employment). Similarly, a leading
treatise on the early operation of the FTCA assumed the viability of a successive claim against the
employee following a non-scope defense by the government; indeed, the author advised lawyers
to take account of the possibility that the statute of limitations might bar the second action. See
WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 78–79 (explaining why government’s tenacity and attorney fee limits
might lead plaintiffs to pursue claims against a well-insured employee, rather than the govern-
ment) (citing United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949) (holding on appeal that the
employee was outside the scope of employment, thus requiring reversal of the judgment against
the United States, and posing a timeliness threat to subsequent litigation against the employee)).
152. See Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1948) (refusing to permit plaintiff
to join government as additional defendant in action to recover damages for federal employee’s
negligent operation of motor vehicle; although FTCA effected waiver of immunity, it did not
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government persisted in removing state law claims against employees under
the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442.153 That meant, as a
practical matter, that some proceedings against the employee and the gov-
ernment might go forward in a single district court. In Moon v. Price, the
district court managed these coordinated proceedings in a way sensibly de-
signed to protect the plaintiff’s right to pursue claims against both par-
ties.154 The court first empanelled a jury to hear the negligence claim
against the employee and approved the entry of a verdict of $2500.155 Then,
the court relied on this finding in disposing of the negligence claim against
the government, finding negligence and awarding $2500 in damages.156
This process of coordination protected the plaintiff’s right to trial by jury on
the claim against the employee without posing a threat of double recovery.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declared that the plaintiff could obtain but a
single satisfaction of the claim.157 The court, however, expressly rejected
the government’s contention (later accepted in Manning v. United States)158
that a later judgment under the FTCA would, in combination with the judg-
ment bar, retroactively invalidate the earlier judgment against the
employee.159
As we have seen, the judgment bar did not foreclose suit against em-
ployees but simply accorded preclusive effect to judgments entered in suits
against the federal government. Unsurprisingly, then, litigants in the wake
of the FTCA’s adoption were free to file suits against both the government
and its employees. While there were obvious advantages to bringing suit
against the (deep-pocketed) government, at least one early commentator on
the FTCA urged litigants to consider suit against employees as well.160
expressly allow joint litigation with its employees); WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 89 (collecting
authority for the inability of plaintiffs to join employee and government as a foregone conclusion).
153. There is some indication that this practice was common prior to 1971. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391 n.4 (1971) (“[I]t is
the present policy of the Department of Justice to remove to the federal courts all suits in state
courts against federal officers for trespass or false imprisonment . . . .”).
154. 213 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954).
155. Id. at 796–97.
156. Id. at 796 (quoting Georgia precedents in determining the preclusive effect of the judg-
ment against the employee and noting that the judgment against the employee preceded that
against the government). Notably, a decision to accord preclusive effect to the negligence finding
would comport with Restatement of Judgments section 84 to the extent that the government exer-
cised control over the defense of the negligence claim against the employee. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942).
157. See Moon, 213 F.2d at 796–97. The government claimed, as it has in some recent Bivens
cases, that the subsequent entry of judgment in an FTCA claim may retroactively invalidate a
prior judgment obtained against the employee. The Moon court rejected this argument for retroac-
tive invalidation, cogently observing that the point of the coordination provisions was to prevent a
double recovery. Because of the looming threat of a finding of no-liability under the FTCA, well-
advised plaintiffs must bring suit against the employee as well.
158. Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2008).
159. Moon, 213 F.2d at 796–97.
160. WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 78.
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Thus, William Wright’s treatise on the FTCA pointed out that the govern-
ment litigated issues (such as scope of employment) quite vigorously, in-
creasing the cost of obtaining and defending a favorable judgment.161
Wright also noted that the FTCA imposes a cap on the amount of attorney’s
fees available to a successful plaintiff.162 He thus suggested that plaintiffs
might reasonably prefer to pursue suit against an employee, at least one
with an applicable insurance policy, rather than against the government.163
Whether they were influenced by Wright’s advice and the govern-
ment’s practice of vigorously contesting scope of employment issues,164
many plaintiffs brought suit against both the government and the employees
whose negligence had caused them injury. While the federal courts could
not exercise original jurisdiction over both the state and federal claims (as
they can today), they understood the need for such duplicative litigation, at
least when the government mounted defenses that threatened to make the
FTCA remedy unavailable and require the victim to look to the employee
instead.165 By the 1950s, the federal courts concluded that the judgment bar
did not foreclose overlapping litigation even though it limited the plaintiff
to a single satisfaction of his claim.
4. The Drivers Act: Confirming the Narrow Scope of the Judgment
Bar
The reality of continuing litigation against federal employees for ve-
hicular negligence set the stage for Congress’s decision to add the Drivers
Act to the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1961.166 Aimed at immunizing fed-
eral employees from claims arising from the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle within the scope of their employment, the Drivers Act provided the
following:
The remedy by suit against the United States as provided by sec-
tion 1346(b) of this title for damage to property or for personal
injury, including death, resulting from the operation by any em-
ployee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, shall hereafter be
exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the
161. Id.
162. Id. at 140.
163. Id. at 78.
164. See United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717, 720–21 (8th Cir. 1952) (arguing that
employee was outside scope of employment, thus precluding liability in suit against the United
States); Satterwhite v. Bocelato, 130 F. Supp. 825, 828–29 (E.D.N.C. 1955) (arguing unsuccess-
fully that government driver was acting outside the scope at the time of the accident).
165. In 1990, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which allowed claimants to join additional
parties to a case where federal questions predominate although a federal court could not otherwise
assert jurisdiction over those parties so long as those claims were adequately related to the claims
over which the court had original jurisdiction.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006). Reports indicate that the government viewed the immunity as
tantamount to purchasing insurance for federal employees.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 81 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 81 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 33 11-MAY-12 16:31
2011] BIVENS, THE JUDGMENT BAR, AND DYNAMIC TEXTUALISM 449
same subject matter against the employee or his estate whose act
or omission gave rise to the claim.167
The Drivers Act did not absolutely immunize federal employees and drivers
from suit but simply made the FTCA’s negligence remedy against the gov-
ernment exclusive of any negligence suit against the employee.168 Like the
judgment bar, the Drivers Act achieved this limitation on the scope of
FTCA exclusivity by declaring it applicable only to suits against the em-
ployee “by reason of the same subject matter.”169 Using a variety of theo-
ries, the lower federal courts were quick to agree that the regime of
exclusivity applied only to suits for negligence as to which Congress had
accepted respondeat superior liability under the FTCA. As to suits for in-
tentional (or other) tortious conduct outside the scope of the FTCA, by con-
trast, federal courts consistently ruled that actions against the employee
could proceed.170
167. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1961) (emphasis added).
168. See, e.g., Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399, 403 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“28 U.S.C.
§ 2679 protects federal employees from suits for damages arising out of their negligent operation
of motor vehicles during the scope of their government employment.”); United States v. Hawaii,
832 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of the [Federal Drivers Act] is to relieve a
federal employee from the need to insure against personal liability arising out of the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle in the course of federal employment.”); Houston v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
823 F.2d 896, 899 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The amendment, known as the Federal Drivers Act (FDA),
deprived plaintiffs whose injuries arose from the negligent operation of a government vehicle of
any claim against the driver in his individual capacity.”); Thomason v. Sanchez, 398 F. Supp. 500,
504 (D.N.J. 1975) (“By enactment of the Federal Drivers Act, Congress sought to protect the
individual federal employee from personal tort liability. This was accomplished by designating
suit against the United States under the FTCA the exclusive remedy for damages sustained as a
result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a federal employee acting within the scope
of his employment.”).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006).
170. Willson v. Cagle, 694 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“The government’s reading of
section 2679(b), pressed to its logical conclusion, would create a third category of injuries for
which no remedy was available: those intentionally caused by government employees while oper-
ating motor vehicles within the scope of their employment. We do not believe that Congress
intended to leave victims bereft of remedy in this situation. Accordingly, we do not accept the
government’s position. Section 2679(b) will instead be given a narrower reading, to preclude only
those tort actions against individual government employees sounding in negligence.”); Adams v.
Jackel, 220 F. Supp. 764, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that a state action against a federal driver
will not be dismissed unless a federal court determines the case to be one “in which a remedy is
‘available’ under the respondeat superior principle . . . and the exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 do
not operate.”). Courts that were asked to interpret other statutes, that were nearly identical to the
Drivers Act, came to similar conclusions. E.g., Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1463 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that federal employees are not immune from claims excepted under the FTCA);
Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1984); Smith v. Dicara, 329 F. Supp. 439, 443
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (“We cannot conclude that in enacting § 4116, Congress intended to immunize
both the Government and the individual employee from the latter’s defamatory conduct, leaving
the injured plaintiff without remedy, which would be the anomalous result under the Govern-
ment’s theory, unsupported by the cases, the relevant statutes, or the legislative history.”). But see
Gush v. Bunker, 344 F. Supp. 247, 248 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (holding that Drivers Act applies to
INS officers accused of fraudulently falsifying immigration papers, and that section 2680(h) can
act to deny claimant a remedy altogether); Powers v. Shultz, 821 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that remedy is not available against doctor in his personal capacity under 10 U.S.C.
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Of course, the statute’s limited exclusivity did not prevent the govern-
ment from maintaining that the regime of preemptive effect extended much
more broadly. The federal courts, however, generally refused to embrace
the government’s contention that immunity barred any transactionally-re-
lated claim against the employee. Instead, as the district court explained in
Willson v. Cagle:
The paradigmatic case that prompted Congress to adopt the Fed-
eral Drivers Act was that of a postman who had an accident while
performing his appointed rounds. Clearly Congress desired that
the postman not be held individually liable in these circum-
stances. The result would have been quite different, however, if
while engaged in his rounds the postman spotted an enemy and
intentionally ran him down. There is no indication that Congress
intended to give government employees carte blanche to inten-
tionally commit mayhem with public vehicles while engaged in
the performance of their public duties. The government’s argu-
ment, if accepted, would lead precisely to this result. The result is
made more unconscionable by the fact that the victim in the
above hypothetical would not even have recourse against the gov-
ernment, as in general the government is not responsible for in-
tentional torts of its employees.171
As Willson illustrates, and many other cases confirm,172 federal drivers
were not immunized from suit for intentional misconduct or other claims to
which the FTCA’s waiver of government immunity did not apply.
Like the judgment bar, the Drivers Act accomplished its goal of nar-
rowing the scope of its exclusivity by including the phrase “by reason of the
same subject matter.”173 As we have seen, that phrase does not apply to any
claim against an employee that happens to arise from the same transaction
or occurrence that led to the victim’s injury. Instead, the phrase refers to
claims cognizable under the FTCA on a theory of vicarious liability. Just as
the judgment bar meant to exclude duplicative actions only where the prior
decision negated the employee’s liability for negligence so too did the Driv-
§ 1089 although claimant had no remedy under the FTCA because of the foreign country excep-
tion found in 2680(k)).
171. Willson, 694 F. Supp. at 716–17; see also Dagnan v. Gouger, No. Civ-1-88-452, 1989
WL 81655, at *3–4 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 1989) (explaining that application of judgment bar to
block suit against employee for intentional misconduct would violate the constitutional guarantee
of due process of law).
172. See, e.g., Nasuti v. Scannell, 792 F.2d 264, 266–69 (1st Cir. 1986) (lower court remanded
plaintiff’s intentional tort claims to state court reasoning that under Massachusetts law a person
who commits an intentional tort is always acting outside the scope of his employment; the court of
appeals affirmed but on different grounds); Willson, 649 F. Supp. at 717 (intentional tort claims
brought against federal driver are not cognizable by the FTCA and thus, claimants may pursue
drivers in their personal capacities); Smith, 329 F. Supp. at 442 (“[I]t is obvious that the Drivers
Act is not applicable to a federal driver who intentionally injures a plaintiff with his motor
vehicle. . . .”).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006).
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ers Act foreclose suits against the employee on claims of negligence as to
which the government accepted vicarious liability. The two provisions thus
represent a natural but narrow progression. The judgment bar foreclosed
suit against the employee for negligence after the victim had pursued a neg-
ligence claim against the government to judgment but left other remedies
against the employee intact (including remedies for intentional torts and
torts committed outside the scope of employment). The Drivers Act flatly
barred the suit against the employee for negligence, thus effectively com-
pelling the victim to pursue such claims against the government. It, how-
ever, did not force the employee to pursue relief, if at all, through the FTCA
on theories of liability that the FTCA did not embrace.174 As the Willson
court recognized, such an interpretation would deny the victim a remedy for
intentional misconduct and would have no warrant in the purpose of the
Drivers Act.
5. The 1974 Amendments
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, recognizing a
federal right of action similar to the one provided under § 1983 yet applica-
ble only to federal officers.175 Just three years later, in 1974, Congress
amended § 2680(h) to provide a remedy against the United States for the
intentional torts of its investigative or law enforcement officers. That
amendment provides:
That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law en-
forcement officers of the United States Government, the provi-
sions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to
any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. . . .176
In effect, the amendment expands the scope of § 1346(b) by waiving the
Government’s sovereign immunity from certain common law intentional
tort claims arising out of the acts or omissions of a law enforcement or
investigative officer.
174. The Court recently held, in Hui v. Casteneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1850–51 (2010), that
another provision, 42 U.S.C. § 233, that is nearly identical to the Drivers Act—except that it
applies to members of the Public Health Service rather than federal drivers—was intended to
absolutely immunize Public Health Service employees from suit, including Bivens suits. While we
believe that Hui was wrongly decided, we leave that discussion for another day. For now, we
believe it sufficient to note that the provision at issue in Hui is readily distinguishable from the
modern Westfall Act. The Westfall Act (as will be discussed below) includes an explicit savings
clause which provides that federal employees are not immune from Bivens suits. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b)(2) (2006). Thus, even if Hui was correctly decided, its affect does not reach employees
who are not protected under a more narrow immunity provision such as 42 U.S.C. § 233.
175. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1974).
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The legislative history of the amendment makes clear that Congress
intended to provide a cause of action that was parallel and complementary
to the remedy already available under Bivens.177 The 1974 amendment was
passed in response to reports that federal officers, based out of St. Louis,
had conducted unconstitutional “no-knock” raids.178 In one raid, conducted
in Collinsville, Illinois, five shabbily dressed federal officers entered the
home of Herbert and Evelyn Giglotto at 9:30 p.m. with guns drawn.179 Af-
ter destroying the Giglottos’ television, camera, and furniture, the officers
admitted that they had entered the wrong home and departed the residence
only to conduct a similar raid on another home just thirty minutes later.180
Recognizing that federal officers are often judgment proof and characteriz-
ing the remedy under Bivens as “hollow” for that reason, Congress
amended the FTCA to provide “innocent individuals who are subjected to
raids of the type conducted in Collinsville, Illinois . . . [with] a cause of
action against the individual federal agents and the Federal Govern-
ment.”181 A Senate report explaining the amendment stated:
[T]his provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens
case and its [progeny], in that it waives the defense of sovereign
immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in
damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have oc-
curred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon
the individual Government officials involved).182
Thus, in 1974, Congress, for the first time, explicitly recognized the impor-
tance of the Bivens remedy for vindicating constitutional rights and took
pains to clarify that the amendment was intended to complement, not dis-
place, the Bivens action.183
177. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (“[T]he congressional comments accompa-
nying that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel,
complementary causes of action.”).
178. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2–3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791; Jack
Boger et al., The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Tort Amendment: An Interpretive Analysis,
54 N.C. L. REV. 497, 500 (1976).
179. Boger et. al., supra note 178, at 500.
180. Id. at 501.
181. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3.
182. Id.; see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20 (citing the Senate report as proof that Congress
intended to supplement, not displace, the Bivens remedy).
183. The Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green, rejected the government’s argument
that the availability of remedies under the FTCA displaced the Bivens right of action. 446 U.S. at
20. The Court concluded that the two remedial schemes were to be viewed as complementary,
rather than preemptive. Id. Such an approach recalls the Court’s first FTCA decision, refusing to
treat other federal disability compensation as impliedly displacing an individual’s remedy under
the FTCA. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). As Brooks suggested, the solution
to statutory overlap was not displacement but coordination to prevent a double recovery.
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6. The Westfall Act
Congress enacted the Westfall Act in 1988184 several months after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Westfall v. Erwin.185 In Westfall, the Supreme
Court held that federal employees were immune from state tort liability
only if their conduct was discretionary in nature and was within the scope
of their employment.186 Congress enacted the Westfall Act to broaden em-
ployee immunity and to “remove the potential personal liability of Federal
employees for common law torts committed within the scope of their em-
ployment.”187 Importantly, Congress explicitly provided that the immunity
provision of the Westfall Act did not extend or apply to Bivens claims,188
for the first time statutorily recognizing the viability of the Bivens remedy.
Central to the Westfall Act was the expansion of official immunity that
Congress had previously conferred on federal employees in the Drivers
Act.189 As with the Drivers Act, however, Congress was careful to narrow
the scope of immunity to claims that were cognizable under the FTCA. To
that end, Congress retained the “by reason of the same subject matter” limi-
tation that had served in the Drivers Act to ensure that intentional tort
claims against federal employees were not precluded. With the adoption of
the Westfall Act, the whole range of state common law claims against fed-
eral employees acting within the scope of their employment was transferred
to federal court and made actionable, if at all, only through suits brought
under the FTCA. While this broad immunity language would foreclose
common law tort claims against federal employees, however, it would not
displace Bivens litigation. Indeed, Congress made that conclusion even
184. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act),
Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988).
185. 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
186. Id. at 300.
187. H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 5945, 5947.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2006).
189. One can best understand the Westfall Act’s operation by superimposing its provisions on
top of the Drivers Act:
(1) The remedy against the United States as provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of
this title for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death, arising or resulting
from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of operation by any employee of the
Government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, shall hereafter be is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money
damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or his estate whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other
civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same
subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is precluded without re-
gard to when the act or omission occurred.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of
the Government -
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under
which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
(emphasis added).
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more certain by exempting suits against government employees for “consti-
tutional violations” from the exclusivity regime of the Westfall Act.190
II. THE JUDGMENT BAR TODAY
One can scarcely overstate the degree to which the judgment bar today
has overleapt its textual and historical boundaries. The Bivens action has
never been brought within the framework of the FTCA in the sense that the
government has never waived its immunity from suit for the constitutional
torts committed by its employees.191 Rather, Congress has preserved sepa-
rate theories of liability: the Constitution provides the foundation for Bivens
liability, and state common law tort theories coupled with respondeat supe-
rior provide the foundation for FTCA liability.192 Despite this careful sepa-
ration of the basis for liability, the federal courts have concluded that the
judgment bar also applies to Bivens claims.193 Moreover, the federal courts
have held that pro-government judgment based on a finding that the claim
in question falls outside the ambit of the FTCA will bar a Bivens action.194
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2006).
191. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (holding that a claim arising under the
Constitution is not cognizable under the FTCA because the FTCA only recognizes claims that
arise under state law whereas a claim arising under the Constitution is necessarily a federal cause
of action).
192. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (“[T]he congressional comments accompanying
the [1974 intentional torts amendment] made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Biv-
ens as parallel, complementary causes of action.”); S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791 (“[The 1974 intentional torts amendment] should be viewed as a
counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign
immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of
conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon
the individual government officials involved).”); Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 6, at 132–33
(discussing the purpose of the 1974 intentional torts amendments).
193. E.g., Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 122 (4th Cir. 2009) (barring the claimant from pursing
a contemporaneously filed Bivens claim after claimant’s FTCA claims were resolved in the gov-
ernment’s favor on summary judgment); Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying the judgment bar to vacate a contemporaneously entered Bivens judgment); Harris v.
United States, 422 F.3d 322, 334 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to reinstate claimant’s Bivens claims
although district court had incorrectly dismissed them as time barred because the claimant had
pursued his FTCA claims to judgment); Williams v. Fleming, 597 F.3d 820, 821 (7th Cir. 2010)
(applying the judgment bar to Bivens claims after dismissing claimant’s FTCA claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1994) (ap-
plying the judgment bar to preclude a subsequently filed Bivens claim); Estate of Trentadue ex rel.
Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 858 (10th Cir. 2005) (giving the judgment bar retroactive
affect by vacating a previously entered Bivens judgment).
194. FTCA claims can be dismissed on non-meritorious grounds for a variety of reasons in-
cluding: 1) the employee was acting outside the scope of his employment; 2) the claims are time
barred; 3) the claims do not arise under state law; 4) the claimant failed to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies; or 5) the claims are excepted under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006), 28
U.S.C. § 2401 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006). The majority of courts
that have confronted this issue hold that a non-merits based dismissal of an FTCA claim will
trigger the judgment bar. E.g., Hoosier v. Bancorp, 90 F.3d 180, 184–85 (7th Cir. 1996) (statute of
limitations); Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 964–65 (10th Cir. 2001) (FTCA claims dismissed for
failure to prosecute); Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1436–38 (abuse of process); Williams, 597 F.3d at 823
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Finally, the courts have refused to coordinate relief in a way that preserves
the litigant’s right to trial by jury in the Bivens action, treating a subsequent
defense judgment under the FTCA as retroactively invalidating an earlier
jury verdict for the plaintiff.195 If not a violation of the Seventh Amend-
ment, such conclusions at least represent a burden on Seventh Amendment
rights that is strikingly inconsistent with the spirit of accommodation re-
flected in earlier cases.
The federal courts committed their decisive interpretive error when
they concluded that Bivens suits were subject to preclusion under the
FTCA’s judgment bar. As we have seen, the judgment bar included a term
of art (i.e., “by reason of the same subject matter”) designed to clarify that it
applied only to judgments rendered in the context of primary-secondary re-
spondeat superior liability.196 The judgment bar effected a modest relaxa-
tion of the rules of mutuality to eliminate duplicative litigation in a narrow
situation; it came into play only when there had been an earlier judgment
and a subsequent suit against the employee brought “by reason of the same
subject matter.”197 This “same-subject-matter” formulation was meant to
limit the statute’s application to situations in which the suit against the em-
ployee was based on the same theory of tort liability that had previously
been litigated under the FTCA.198 Congress concluded that a judgment for
the victim would provide full compensation (through the operation of the
Judgment Fund)199 and that a judgment for the government would necessa-
rily entail a finding of non-negligence that should entitle the employee to
relief from duplicative litigation. With its “same-subject-matter” limitation,
however, the judgment bar did not foreclose all suits against the employee
that arose from the same transaction or occurrence as those terms have been
(FTCA claims not cognizable); Janis v. United States, No. 03-6221, 2011 WL 1258521, at *1–2
(2d Cir. Oct. 22, 2004) (statute of limitations). But see Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 156 (2d
Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (holding that
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not trigger the judgment bar).
195. See Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2008); Engle v. Mecke, 24
F.3d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1994); McCabe v. Macaulay, No. 05-CV-73-LRR, 2008 WL 2980013, at
*14 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 1, 2008); Aguilar, 397 F.3d at 859.
196. The judgment bar limited its operative scope to subsequent claims that could be catego-
rized as “by reason of the same subject matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006).
197. Id.
198. As discussed above, the judgment bar was meant to codify preclusion law as it stood in
1946. Congressional testimony discussing the judgment bar indicates that Congress anticipated
that the judgment bar would only bar subsequent claims that were functionally equivalent to
claims that had been tried to judgment against the government under the FTCA. Tort Claims,
supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the judgment bar and stating “the judgment in a tort action consti-
tutes a bar to further action upon the same claim not only against the Government (as would have
been true [in the absence of the judgment bar]) but also against the delinquent employee”) (em-
phasis added); see also id. at 32 (“the judgment rendered will constitute a bar to further action
upon the same claim not only against the Government but also against the employee.”) (emphasis
added).
199. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2010).
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used to define modern notions200 of supplemental jurisdiction and claim
preclusion.201 Indeed, as we have seen, the early decisions quite clearly
recognized (in keeping with the common law contours of the judgment bar
rule) that a judgment of government non-liability on the scope of employ-
ment grounds would not foreclose a subsequent suit against the employee
for intentional misconduct even if that second action arose from the very
same set of events and thus met the transaction or occurrence test.202
The same-subject-matter limitation that prevents application of the
judgment bar does not, of course, foreclose judicial efforts to address dupli-
cative litigation or double recovery. It simply means that the federal courts
must justify their decisions to coordinate litigation under the FTCA and
Bivens on other grounds. The first step comes in a forthright acknowledge-
200. See Manego v. Orleans Bd. of Trade., 773 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)) (defining the modern transaction test as barring a
subsequent action if it is related to the former action “in time, space, origin, or motivation,
whether the two claims would have formed a convenient trial package, and whether their treat-
ment as a unit would have conformed to the parties expectations or business understanding or
usage.”).
201. The definition of the term “cause of action” has changed considerably since 1946. Ne-
vada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130–31 (1983) (comparing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 61 (1942) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)). “Definitions of
what constitutes the ‘same cause of action’ have not remained static over time.” Id. In a footnote,
the Nevada court explained that under the First Restatement of Judgments section 61 causes of
action were “deemed the same if the evidence needed to sustain the second cause of action would
have sustained the first action.” Id. § 24 n.12. However, under the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments section 24, a more “pragmatic approach” was taken whereby two causes of action were
considered the same if they arose from the same “transaction.” Id.; see generally Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545, 562 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he contours of the federal cause of
action—or ‘case’—were then more narrowly defined than they are today, see, e.g., Hurn v. Ours-
ler. . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1982) (“The present trend is to see
claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of
substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available
to the plaintiff; regardless of the number of primary rights that may have been invaded; and
regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to support the theories or rights. The transac-
tion is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not be split.”). Thus, in 1946, the term
“cause of action” was defined narrowly by reference to the “rights and wrongs” test. Baltimore S.
S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321–22 (1927) (“The injured respondent was bound to set forth in
his first action for damages every ground of negligence which he claimed to exist and upon which
he relied, and cannot be permitted, as was attempted here to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive actions to recovery for the same wrong and injury.”) (emphasis added). In 1966, the
Supreme Court overruled the Hurn rights and wrongs test as “unnecessarily grudging.” United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (The rights and wrongs test is “unnec-
essarily grudging. Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a
claim ‘arising under (the) Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority . . . ,’ and the relationship between that claim and the
state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one consti-
tutional ‘case.’ The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although Gibbs was speaking with reference to sup-
plemental jurisdiction, modern courts utilize the Gibbs transactional test in the context of preclu-
sion law as well. See Manego, 773 F.2d at 5.
202. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (collecting authority).
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ment that the judgment bar has not specified the rules of coordination. Such
an acknowledgement would require the federal courts to take responsibility
for the rules they apply and to justify those rules as part of the common law
process. As it turns out, the Supreme Court provided guidance on this sub-
ject in the very first case it decided under the FTCA. In Brooks v. United
States, the Court treated the FTCA remedy as supplementary to the remedy
available to members of the armed forces but was quick to add that the
victims would be entitled only to a single satisfaction of their injuries.203
Building on the common law “single satisfaction” rule,204 we offer some
suggestions about how these rules of coordination might develop, taking
account of both modern notions of supplemental jurisdiction and the need to
protect the right to trial by jury. First, however, we must catalog some of
the more striking consequences of the federal courts’ mistaken decision to
bring Bivens suits within the scope of the judgment bar.
A. Application of the Judgment Bar to Invalidate Bivens Claims
As noted above, the federal courts took a crucial misstep when they
concluded that a judgment for (or against) the government under the FTCA
would bar a suit against an employee under Bivens. At least three factors
helped confirm the federal courts in their error. First, Congress’s decision in
1974 to subject the government to liability for certain intentional torts cre-
ated a need for coordination.205 The same alleged misconduct (such as the
unconstitutional invasion of private homes in East St. Louis that triggered
the adoption of the 1974 statute) could give rise to intentional tort claims
under the FTCA and constitutional tort claims under Bivens.206 Although
the Supreme Court acknowledged the overlap in Carlson v. Green, it sensi-
bly concluded (based on fairly clear statutory text and history) that Con-
gress did not intend the FTCA to displace the Bivens remedy.207 As a result,
203. As the Court explained in Brooks, confronting potential overlap between the FTCA and
other provisions for the compensation of injured service members, “[w]e will not call either rem-
edy in the present case exclusive, nor pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Con-
gress has not done so.” 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 50 (1982); see infra note 254.
205. As discussed above, in 1974 Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) to allow claimants
to bring claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution against the federal government where the act or omission giving rise to the claim was
committed by an “investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States government.”
206. E.g., Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 111–12 (4th Cir. 2009) (claimants alleged state law
claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment under the FTCA and constitutional claims
under the First and Fourth Amendments wherein all claims arose from the same conduct—a
search of the claimants’ home); Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 2005) (claim-
ant brought claims under the FTCA for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, battery, as-
sault, and abuse of process as well as constitutional claims where all claims arose from the same
conduct); Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1989) (claimants alleged constitutional
claims as well as state law claims under the FTCA stemming from the same high speed chase).
207. 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2879 (“Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to create a cause of action against the
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the Court confirmed the existence of parallel and potentially duplicative
remedies without providing any guidance as to how the two overlapping
claims might coexist.208 Second, liberal rules of joinder, coupled with the
recognition of a federal right of action against officials, meant that victims
of alleged wrongdoing were entitled to bring Bivens claims and FTCA
claims in a single proceeding.209 Third, the language of the judgment bar,
with its reference to the same subject matter, appears to modern eyes less
like a restatement of the historically narrow conception of the mutuality
exception (non-mutual issue preclusion) and more like a standard of trans-
actional relationship.210
What happened, in short, was a form of dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion. A term of art, same-subject-matter, that had been used in the 1940s to
limit the reach of the judgment bar to the same legal claim on which the
government had waived its immunity was read in the 1980s and 1990s to
United States for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, the congres-
sional comments accompanying that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA
and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.”) (citation omitted)).
208. Although the Carlson court did not provide guidance as to how courts should coordinate
between overlapping Bivens and FTCA claims, the Court more recently stated, in dicta, that where
a Bivens and FTCA claim are brought contemporaneously the judgment bar plays no role in coor-
dinating between the claims. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 354 (2004) (“If a Bivens action
alone is brought, there will be no possibility of a judgment bar, nor will there be so long as a
Bivens action against officials and a Tort Claims Act against the Government are pending simulta-
neously . . . .”).
209. In 1971, the Supreme Court established an independent jurisdictional hook over federal
employees when it acknowledged a private right of action against agents of the Government for
deprivations of constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Thus, after 1971, courts could establish jurisdiction over federal
employees under Bivens, but because many Bivens actions alleged claims that arose out of an
excepted intentional tort, section 2680(h) prevented courts from asserting jurisdiction over the
Government in the same action. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2–3 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789. By amending section 2680(h) in 1974 to allow claimants to file certain inten-
tional tort claims against federal employees, Congress enabled courts to assert jurisdiction over
the Government and federal employees in those instances where a plaintiff alleged conduct that
could be pled as a constitutional violation as well as a tort cognizable under 1346(b). Prior to
1974, claimants rarely had the opportunity to pursue a claim under the FTCA and a claim against
the federal employee in the same action. The rules of supplemental jurisdiction simply did not
allow a claimant to join his claims against the federal employee and his claims against the govern-
ment in a single action. See, e.g., United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717, 721–22 (8th Cir.
1952) (stating in dicta that where there is no diversity of citizenship between claimant and em-
ployee, court cannot exercise jurisdiction over employee); Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690,
690 (D. Mass. 1948) (“I find no language in the Act whereby the Government consented to be
sued along with its employees.”); Benbow v. Wolf, 217 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1954) (dismissing
suit against government employee because claimant and employee were not diverse); Williams v.
United States, 405 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1969) (claimant cannot join federal or state employees
in a suit against the United States unless an independent ground of jurisdiction exists). Note,
however, that federal courts could assert jurisdiction over a federal employee if that employee
elected to remove an action brought against him in state court to federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1948). See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391 n.4 (1971) (“[I]t is the present policy of the
Department of Justice to remove to the federal courts all suits in state courts against federal of-
ficers for trespass or false imprisonment . . . .”).
210. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
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reach Bivens claims (for which there was no waiver of immunity) on the
theory that they arose from the same set of events. One can see this statu-
tory dynamism in operation in many of the leading cases that extend the
judgment bar to Bivens actions. As the Sixth Circuit explained in 1986,
federal courts “have consistently read the [judgment bar] to bar a Bivens
claim against a government employee ‘arising out of the same actions,
transactions, or occurrences’ as an FTCA claim.”211 The court thus substi-
tuted the language of transactional relationship for the statute’s reference to
the same subject matter, concluding that a “judgment” on the merits of
FTCA claims triggers the bar whenever “those claims ‘aris[e] out of the
same actions, transactions, or occurrences’ as his Bivens claims.”212 Miss-
ing was any discussion of the origins of the judgment bar and its limited
original application to claims brought against employees for which the
FTCA also provides a remedy against the government.213
Underlying this statutory dynamism, one can identify a concern with
coordination of remedies and a fear of double recovery. These concerns
doubtless have merit; an alleged victim of government wrongdoing cannot
fairly claim to have a right to secure a judgment against the government,
satisfy that judgment through the judgment fund,214 and then pursue addi-
tional compensation for the same invasion from the employee in a Bivens
action. As a result, we find the theme of avoiding double recovery running
through the cases on the judgment bar’s application to Bivens.215 One court
explained the concern as follows:
Of course, a plaintiff still may bring a Bivens claim and pursue it
to judgment. But having chosen to bring an FTCA claim as well,
211. E.g., Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 239 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Arevalo v. Woods,
811 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1987); Engle v. Mecke, 24 F.3d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1994); Farmer v.
Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 962 (10th Cir. 2001); Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 333–34 (6th
Cir. 2005); Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 2008); Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d
103, 122 (4th Cir. 2009); Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 858
(10th Cir. 2005); Abuhouran v. Morrison, No. 07-5513, 2011 WL 1004038, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
18, 2011); Andrews v. Gee, 599 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D.S.C. 1984).
212. Harris, 422 F.3d at 333.
213. Textualism has influenced other courts as well. In a Seventh Circuit opinion from 1991,
the court found the breadth of the statutory text decisive, explaining the “[o]ther circuits have held
that a ‘complete’ bar to ‘any’ action by the claimant means that a judgment against the United
States in an FTCA action precludes recovery of a judgment against individual defendants in a
Bivens action for the same acts or omissions.” Clifton v. Miller, No. 97-2342, 1998 WL 78992, at
*2 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998). Here again, the court focused on the reference to acts or omissions and
did not give any special weight to the same-subject-matter limitation.
214. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2010).
215. E.g., Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that the principal
purpose of the judgment bar is to prevent duplicative recoveries), rev’d on other grounds; Kreines
v. United States, 959 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We thereby read [the judgment bar] to
preclude dual recover[ies].”); Clifton v. Miller, No. 97-2342, 1998 WL 78992, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb.
19, 1998) (declaring that the judgment bar prevents double recoveries); Ting v. United States, 927
F.2d 1504, 1513 (9th Cir. 1991) (similar holding); Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399, 404
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (similar holding).
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the statute provides that a “judgment in [that] action . . . consti-
tute[s] a complete bar to any action by the claimant . . . against
the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim.” [In other words,] a “decision to sue the govern-
ment . . . affects the availability of a Bivens action against the
federal officer. Although the plaintiff may elect initially to bring
his action against either defendant, a judgment against the United
States under the FTCA constitutes ‘a complete bar to any action
by the claimant.’” [Or, to quote another decision,] “[t]he
FTCA . . . imposes an election of remedies. While a plaintiff may
maintain both a FTCA and a Bivens action, . . . recovery against
the United States bars recovery against the employee.”216
The courts’ willingness to apply the judgment bar to block a Bivens action
thus appears to draw support from its concern with double recovery, a con-
cern (as the court observes) that led common law courts to impose an elec-
tion of remedies.
B. Retroactive Invalidation of Jury Verdicts
Building on the (mistaken) perception that the judgment bar imposes
an election of remedies, the federal courts have held that an FTCA judg-
ment bars all Bivens judgments, including those based upon an earlier jury
verdict.217 Consider Manning v. United States. There, the jury agreed with
Manning that agents of the FBI had conspired to secure his wrongful con-
viction for kidnapping and other charges.218 The district court directed the
entry of judgment on the jury’s $6.5 million verdict on Manning’s Bivens
claims against the agents.219 Later, the district court conducted a bench trial,
assessing Manning’s claims under the FTCA for the same misconduct. Re-
markably, the district court failed to treat the prior jury resolution as con-
trolling on the question of wrongful conspiracy, concluding instead that the
government bore no liability for the claims at issue.220 Even more remarka-
bly, the district court cited its own judgment for the government on the
FTCA claims as the basis for invalidating the prior Bivens verdict.221
Manning represents only the most striking example of the willingness
of federal judges to set aside jury verdicts under Bivens on the basis of their
own view of the facts. In a common scenario, district courts conduct simul-
taneous trials of claims under Bivens and the FTCA and treat the entry of
judgment under the FTCA (whether favorable or unfavorable to the claim-
216. Harris, 422 F.3d at 337.
217. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (citing Engle, among others).
218. Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 432 (7th Cir. 2008).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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ant) as the basis for invalidating any Bivens claim.222 Here again, the courts
deploy the supposedly plain and unyielding terms of the statutory text as the
basis for these dysfunctional and unjust results. When the judgment bar
speaks of the foreclosure of “any claim” against the employee,223 the fed-
eral courts apply the terms with a vengeance. Missing from the evaluation
has been any concern with the jury trial rights of individuals pursuing
claims against federal officers for a violation of their constitutional rights.
Indeed, few cases acknowledge that the claimants’ jury trial rights might be
implicated.224
This result represents a dramatic departure from the nation’s early his-
tory when fear of federal overreaching led to demands for jury trial protec-
tion and the eventual ratification of the Seventh Amendment. In one of the
most striking images from the debates over the Constitution’s ratification,
one Anti-Federalist imagined a federal officer rummaging around in the
bedroom and bedclothes of a suspect’s family and then evading trial before
a local jury on the common law action for damages that would otherwise
surely follow.225 While one can cheerfully acknowledge that the Seventh
Amendment does not apply to suits against the government, one must also
recognize that the Supreme Court in other contexts has urged the federal
courts to coordinate litigation to preserve the jury trial right as it applies to
claims against individuals (including federal officials).226 In early cases
222. E.g., Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 334 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that
[the judgment bar] applies even when ‘the claims were tried together in the same suit and [ ] the
judgments were entered simultaneously.’”) (citation omitted); Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814,
816 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The moment judgment was entered against the government, then by virtue
of [the judgment bar], [defendant] was no longer answerable to [claimant] for damages.”); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[A] judgment against the
United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment
against [government officials].”); Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t is
inconsequential that the claims were tried together in the same suit and that judgments were en-
tered simultaneously.”); United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1952) (“The
District Court, having awarded a judgment in favor of [plaintiff] in his action against the United
States, could not in the face of the explicit provisions of the Act, order judgment against [the
government employee] in the same action.”).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006).
224. To be sure, no right to trial by jury attaches to claims under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2402
(2011). But plaintiffs surely enjoy a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in the litigation of
an otherwise valid Bivens claim. Hui v. Casteneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1850 (2010) (“Bivens cases
may be tried before a jury.”).
225. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 154 (John B. McMaster
& Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888) (anonymous remarks made in 1787 in response to Federalist
delegate James Wilson’s convention speech on the initial exclusion of a Bill of Rights).
226. See also United States v. Yellowcab, 340 U.S. 543, 555–56 (1951) (citing Ryan Distrib-
uting Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943)); Ford v. C.E. Wilson & Co., 30 F. Supp.
163, 165 (D. Conn. 1939); Munkacsy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2 F.R.D. 380, 381 (E.D.N.Y.
1942); Mealy v. Fidelity Nat’l Bank, 2 F.R.D. 339, 339–40 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Elkins v. Noble, 1
F.R.D. 357, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(c), 39, 42 (providing examples of how
courts should try non-FTCA claims when brought contemporaneously with FTCA claims); Bea-
con Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) (holding that when equitable and legal claims
are brought in the same suit, the legal claims should be tried to a jury before the equitable claims
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under the FTCA, therefore, both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts used coordination strategies designed to prevent unnecessary erosion
of the jury trial right. Thus, in United States v. Yellowcab,227 an early FTCA
case, the Court anticipated later Seventh Amendment decisions by urging
coordination of claims against individual and government defendants to
preserve jury trial rights.228 An early example of this effective coordination
appears in Moon v. Price where the district court first tried the claims
against the employee to the jury and then incorporated the jury’s findings
into its own assessment of the FTCA claim.229 Part III suggests tools of
coordination that modern courts might use to achieve similar results.
C. Invalidation Based on Judgments that the FTCA Does Not Apply
In perhaps the most wooden application of the judgment bar, a series
of cases hold that claims falling outside the scope of the FTCA nonetheless
bar claims under Bivens.230 For a representative illustration of this applica-
tion of the judgment bar, consider Williams v. Fleming.231 There, Williams
brought suit under the FTCA, alleging that a bank examiner at the FDIC
had acted on the basis of racial animus in encouraging the plaintiff’s bank
to stop making loans to the plaintiff and other African Americans.232 The
plaintiff also brought a racial discrimination claim against the examiner
under Bivens.233 In evaluating the FTCA claim, the district court consulted
Illinois law and concluded that the nearest analogous tort claim was slan-
der.234 (Illinois state law was interpreted as failing to recognize a tort of
are decided by the court); Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 579 (1990) (explaining courts must try legal issues to a jury before trying equitable claims
with the attendant collateral estoppel effects).
227. In United States v. Yellowcab, the Court held that the United States had consented to be
impleaded as a third party defendant for contribution under the FTCA. 340 U.S. 543, 553 (1951).
228. Id. at 555–56 (instructing federal courts to try non-FTCA claims brought contemporane-
ously with FTCA claims in the same manner as legal and equitable claims are tried when brought
in the same action).
229. 213 F.2d 794, 797 (5th Cir. 1954) (trying non-FTCA claims to a jury before issuing a
decision as to claimant’s FTCA claims and then providing plaintiff with an election of remedies
pursuant to Georgia preclusion law).
230. See, e.g., Hoosier Bancorp of Indiana, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 90 F.3d 180, 184–85 (7th Cir.
1996) (“‘[A]ny FTCA judgment, regardless of its outcome, bars a subsequent Bivens action on the
same conduct . . . .’”) (citation omitted); Williams v. Fleming, 597 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding FTCA claims not cognizable); see also Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 964–65 (10th
Cir. 2001) (finding FTCA claims dismissed for failure to prosecute); Gasho v. United States, 39
F.3d 1420, 1436–38 (9th Cir. 1994) (abuse of process); Janis v. United States, No.
1:04–CV–05812–SKO PC, 2011 WL 1258521, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) (statute of
limitations). But see Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 354 (2006) (holding that dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction does not trigger the judgment bar).
231. 597 F.3d at 820.
232. Id. at 821.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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racial discrimination.) Looking to the FTCA, the district court found that
defamation claims were excluded from the Act’s coverage.235 It thus en-
tered judgment for the government on the FTCA claim.236 Having done so,
the court next concluded that the judgment bar was triggered and foreclosed
the Bivens claim for racial discrimination.237 The plaintiff was thus denied
his day in court on his constitutional claim for race-based discrimination.
A moment’s reflection will reveal the problem with the approach taken
in these cases. The judgment bar was designed to deal with respondeat su-
perior liability; a finding of non-negligence in litigation against the govern-
ment would bar a later attempt to pursue the same negligence claim against
the employee.238 When, however, the government escaped liability by argu-
ing that the actions of the employee were intentional and thus outside the
scope of the FTCA’s waiver of immunity for negligence claims, the judg-
ment bar had no application, and suit against the employee was permit-
ted.239 Similarly, if the court found that the employee was acting outside the
scope of employment, a judgment for the government on that basis would
not bar a later suit against the employee.240 Indeed, the whole structure of
the FTCA assumed the viability of suits against the employee if the govern-
ment succeeded in arguing that the conduct in question fell outside the
scope of its acceptance of respondeat superior liability or into another ex-
ception (like libel or slander). Far from barring suit against the employee,
the entry of judgment for the government in such situations served to con-
firm that the employee was the proper defendant. The FTCA achieved this
goal of coordination by limiting the judgment bar to claims against the em-
ployee by “reason of the same subject matter.”
235. Id. at 821–22. One might have more fairly characterized the claim as one for interference
with advantageous business relations, a tort not expressly exempted from the FTCA. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006) (exempting intentional interference with contract but not with business
relations).
236. See Williams, 597 F.3d at 820–21.
237. Id. at 822.
238. See supra note 198 (noting legislative commentary regarding meaning of same subject
matter).
239. See, e.g., Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1460–61 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding where plain-
tiff brought suit for negligence and assault against a doctor of the Veterans Administration and the
Government, the plaintiff’s claims as to the Government were dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under section 2680(h), but let the plaintiff’s claims stand as to the doctor in his per-
sonal capacity without discussing the Judgment Bar); Smith v. DiCara, 329 F. Supp. 439, 442
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding where claimant brought suit against doctor for defamation in state court,
the Attorney General removed to federal court under 38 U.S.C. § 4116, and the court dismissed
the action against the Government for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under section 2680(h),
claimant was free to pursue his claim against doctor in state court—where Judgment Bar was not
discussed); see also supra note 170 and accompanying text (string cite of cases starting with
Willson v. Cagle).
240. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007, 1011 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that where
court determines that employee was acting outside the scope of his employment and dismisses an
FTCA suit on that basis for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must remand to state
court); see also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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Stepping back from the statutory particulars, the unfairness of the re-
sult in Williams deserves mention. The court barred Williams from offering
proof of his claim that racial animus led to the cancellation of the favorable
credit-relationship that he had previously enjoyed with his bank.241 The jus-
tification for that result ultimately rests on the claim that Williams sued the
wrong party on the wrong theory of liability.242 Such an error can fairly
foreclose further litigation against the government. It, however, cannot
fairly foreclose litigation against another defendant who may bear liability
for the events in question on a constitutional tort theory. As we will see, a
finding that one possible obligor has no liability to the plaintiff does not
ordinarily bar claims against other possible obligors, and the judgment bar
was not designed to impose a broader rule of non-party preclusion.
Struck with the unfairness of preclusion based on a prior non-merits
determination of an FTCA claim, some courts have struggled to avoid the
conclusion reached in the Williams line of cases.243 Thus, in Hallock v.
Bonner, the Second Circuit refused to endorse the Seventh Circuit’s ap-
proach.244 The case arose from an apparently botched child pornography
investigation; federal agents seized and allegedly destroyed the Hallocks’
computer equipment but found no evidence that the Hallocks were anything
more than the innocent victims of identity theft.245 The Hallocks first sued
under the FTCA but lost when the district court found that the seizure of
their property fell within an exception for property detained by the govern-
ment.246 The Hallocks subsequently sued under Bivens.247 In evaluating the
Bivens claim, the Second Circuit correctly noted that application of the
judgment bar would make no sense; statutory limits on the scope of the
government’s acceptance of liability under the FTCA simply did not bear
on the viability of a constitutional tort claim against federal officers for
wrongful home invasion and destruction of property.248 The Second Circuit
avoided a finding of preclusion by characterizing the FTCA disposition as
one based on Congress’s decision to retain the government’s sovereign im-
munity.249 Judgments based on sovereign immunity were said to rest on a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to lack preclusive effect.250
One can certainly question the wisdom of the Hallock court’s decision
to rely on a supposed lack of jurisdiction as the basis for denying preclusive
241. See Williams, 597 F.3d at 821.
242. See id. at 821–22 (the district court dismissed the action because it determined that the
claim was one for slander, a claim excepted under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
243. See supra note 193.
244. 387 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds.
245. Id. at 150.
246. Id. at 151.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 155.
249. See id. at 155.
250. Id.
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effect to the prior FTCA judgment,251 but the decision not to apply the
judgment bar was entirely sound. The court could have better achieved its
sensible goal by drawing on the history of the same-subject-matter limita-
tion as a predicate for narrowing the ambit of the judgment bar. On that
view, the Bivens action against the government employees would have been
regarded as arising from a subject matter different from the FTCA claim for
destruction of property that was brought against the government.
D. Alternative Tools of Coordination: Preclusion Law and the Single
Satisfaction Rule
Federal courts apparently fear that a limited (though historically accu-
rate) view of the ambit of the judgment bar would lead to double recovery
and uncoordinated litigation.252 The common law, however, furnishes the
federal courts with an ample set of tools to address these concerns. While a
plaintiff may pursue claims successively against a range of potential parties,
rules of non-party preclusion ensure that determinations in related litigation
can be given effect in subsequent suits against different parties.253 In addi-
tion, the single satisfaction rule ensures that a plaintiff may recover but a
single satisfaction for any particular injury.254 These modes of coordination
251. The decision created a circuit split that remains unresolved. The Supreme Court granted
review in Hallock but ultimately concluded that a judgment bar defense to a Bivens action was not
the sort of defense to which the collateral order doctrine applied and dismissed for want of appel-
late jurisdiction. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 354–55 (2006). Since then, the Seventh Circuit
has reaffirmed its view both that dismissals based on the inapplicability of the FTCA should be
regarded as judgments on the merits, rather than as jurisdictional, see Collins v. United States, 564
F.3d 833, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2009), and that such dismissals trigger the application of the judgment
bar. See Williams v. Fleming, 597 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2010).
252. See supra note 36.
253. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 62, § 4464.
254. See, e.g., Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705, 705 (Ohio 1940) (“Where a liability arises
against both a master and his servant in favor of a party injured by the sole negligence of the latter
while acting for the master, such injured party may sue either the servant, primarily liable, or the
master, secondarily liable, or both, in separate actions, as a judgment in his favor against one, until
satisfied, is no bar to an action against the other, the injured party being entitled to full satisfaction
from either the master or servant or from both.”); Hart v. Guardian Trust Co., 75 N.E.2d 570, 583
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1945) (“For the wrong of a servant acting within the scope of his authority, the
plaintiff has a right of action against either the master or the servant, or against both, in separate
actions, as a judgment against one is no bar to an action or judgment against the other until one
judgment is satisfied.”); Huey v. Dykes, 82 So. 481, 482 (Ala. 1919) (satisfaction of judgment by
master or servant will bar subsequent action against the other); O’Briant v. Pryor, 195 S.W. 759,
760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917) (“Where, for example, a master is liable for the tort of his servant, a
satisfaction from one discharges both . . . .”) (citation omitted); Andrews v. Gee, 599 F. Supp.
251, 254 (D.S.C. 1984) (“Because a plaintiff may have but one satisfaction for a wrong, once a
party is fully compensated for his or her injuries, he or she is barred from filing a second lawsuit
based on the same injuries.”); Brown v. United States, 838 F.2d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1988)
(where claimant settled with employee for amount in excess of judgment in FTCA suit, Govern-
ment was entitled to total setoff in accordance with Florida law); Sanchez v. Rowe, 651 F. Supp.
571, 576 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (where judgment was entered against government and employee simul-
taneously, claimant was entitled to an election of remedies whereby he could elect whether to
collect from the employee or the United States).
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help to ensure judicial economy and fairness to litigants without the harsh-
ness of imposing a required election of remedies under the judgment bar.
As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
[An election of remedies was] often justified as a means of
preventing double recovery for the loss involved. These rules are
now obsolete. Double recovery is foreclosed by the rule that only
one satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is the subject of
two or more judgments . . . . Requiring that a single action be
brought or that the injured party make an election of remedies
also formerly had justification insofar as it precluded relitigation
of matters previously adjudicated, particularly the issue of the
amount of damages sustained. This objective is now accom-
plished by the modern rule that a claimant may not relitigate is-
sues determined adversely to him in a prior action against another
adversary, including issues relating to the damage he has
sustained.255
In short, the common law now permits victims of alleged wrongdoing to
pursue tort claims to judgment against a range of potential tort “obligors”
without being forced to an election of remedies.256 The amount of a plain-
tiff’s damages for any particular injury, however, cannot exceed the amount
awarded in a litigated case.257 Nor can the plaintiff obtain a double recov-
ery; the second judgment debtor will receive a credit for any amounts paid
by the first obligor.258
Embedded in the Second Restatement, these well-established common
law rules apply to constitutional tort litigation in the federal courts. The first
element of the rule, reflected in Restatement 2d section 49, allows a plain-
tiff with claims against a variety of co-obligors to pursue claims against
each of them independently.259 Entry of judgment in litigation against one
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 49 cmt. a (1982).
256. Id. (“A judgment against one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the
injured party may have against another person who may be liable therefor.”).
257. See id. § 51 (collecting authority); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1)(b)
(1942) (providing that a judgment for the victim in a suit against the servant will bind the victim
as to the amount of the recovery in a subsequent action against the master).
258. E.g., Branch v. United States, 979 F.2d 948, 951–52 (2d Cir. 1992) (where claimant
settled claim against employee, claimant was entitled to pursue Government in subsequent suit but
Government was entitled to offset the prior settlement in accordance with New York law); Brown,
838 F.2d at 1161 (where claimant settled with employee for amount in excess of judgment in
FTCA suit, Government was entitled to total setoff in accordance with Florida law).
259. See also Gargiul v. Tompkins, 704 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1983) (a Second Circuit deci-
sion that upheld the right of a teacher to pursue successive suits to challenge her suspension
without pay). The teacher’s first action, against the school board in state court, resulted in a
defense judgment on a claim based upon state law. Id. at 664. The teacher sued again, this time on
a constitutional tort claim under section 1983, and named both the school board and individual
members of the board as defendants. Id. at 665. The trial court dismissed all of the claims on
preclusion grounds. Id. The Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that preclusion barred the suit
against the school board but not against the individual board members. Id. at 669. As potential co-
obligors who were not made parties to the state court action, the board members were subject to
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co-obligor does not bar successive litigation against a different obligor.260
One can see the rule illustrated in Headley v. Bacon, an Eighth Circuit deci-
sion that upheld the right of a former police officer to pursue successive
harassment claims.261 The officer’s first action was brought against the city
under Title VII for sexual harassment and resulted in a judgment in her
favor.262 The second action named her former fellow police officers (those
who had engaged in the acts of harassment identified in the earlier litiga-
tion) and sought damages from them in their personal capacities.263 Al-
though the Eighth Circuit agreed that the claims were the same for
preclusion purposes (and could have been joined to the Title VII action), the
court ultimately concluded that the individual defendants were not parties to
the first proceeding and were thus incapable of invoking the doctrine of
preclusion to block the second suit.264 The court acknowledged that the
same conduct was at issue in both proceedings and that the city’s liability,
under respondeat superior, was based on that very conduct.265 In keeping
with settled law, however, the city’s vicarious liability for the acts of its
employees did not bring the parties into privity for purposes of precluding
the second action.266
Two other features moderate the rule permitting separate pursuit of co-
obligors. First, defendants in the second proceeding can rely on a variety of
defensive non-mutual preclusion doctrines. If the plaintiff fails to succeed
in the first action, findings made in the course of the rejection of the claim
will apply to bar aspects of the second litigation on theories of non-mutual
preclusion.267 For this reason and for reasons of economy generally, liti-
gants will often prefer to pursue claims against the government and its em-
ployees in a single proceeding.268 Second, the single satisfaction rule will
prevent the plaintiff from obtaining a double recovery, thus providing a
mechanism for coordinating potentially overlapping claims in constitutional
being named as defendants in the teacher’s second proceeding (although the appellate court con-
cluded that qualified immunity barred the claims against them). Id. at 666–67; see also Roy v.
City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517 (1st Cir. 1983).
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (1982).
261. 828 F.2d 1272, 1279–80 (8th Cir. 1987).
262. Id. at 1276.
263. Id. at 1274.
264. Id. at 1279–80.
265. Id. at 1279.
266. Id. at 1276. This explains why courts have reached the (superficially odd) conclusion that
a government official sued in his official capacity is not necessarily in privity with himself, when
sued in his individual capacity. See also Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A]
government official in his official capacity is not in privity with himself in his individual capacity
for purposes of res judicata.”); Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1521–22 (1st Cir. 1983)
(determining that a city councilman and city attorney were not privies with the city and therefore
not parties to a prior action).
267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
268. See id. § 51 cmt. a.
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tort litigation.269 These tools of coordination have been routinely applied in
litigation under § 1983,270 confirming that the federal courts can abandon
their overbroad interpretation of the judgment bar without inviting double
recoveries and duplicative litigation.
Consider Gonzales v. Hernandez,271 which nicely illustrates the use of
coordination tools in § 1983 litigation. There, the plaintiff brought suit
against her former employer—a state-run hospital—in state court and ob-
tained a mixed result: the jury rejected her discrimination claim but returned
a verdict of $170,000 on her retaliation claim.272 Then, the plaintiff brought
a second action in federal court, seeking damages under § 1983 from the
employees on theories of discrimination and retaliation.273 Following the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 51 and the law of New Mexico,
the Tenth Circuit found that the prior rejection of the discrimination claim
against the employer operated to foreclose the discrimination claim against
the employees.274 Because the plaintiff had won on her retaliation claim,
however, she could proceed on that claim against the employees in federal
court; they were not in privity with their employer, and she was not obli-
gated to join them as defendants in the state proceeding.275 Still, the mea-
sure of damages was controlled in part by the prior litigation.276 As for
compensatory damages, the plaintiff could recover no more than the
$170,000 that the jury had previously awarded her.277 As for punitive dam-
ages, the plaintiff was free to pursue them in federal court inasmuch as there
was no provision for an award of punitive damages in the prior proceed-
ing.278 In the end, the result achieves a measure of coordination while pre-
269. Notably, the Supreme Court invoked the single satisfaction rule in attempting to suggest
a mode of coordination in its first decision under the FTCA. In Brooks v. United States, the Court
refused to treat a compensation remedy for service members as exclusive of the remedy under the
FTCA. 337 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1949). But the Court nonetheless observed that the victims were
entitled to but a single satisfaction for their losses and remanded to allow the district court to
explore how best to coordinate relief. Id. at 54. Today, the Restatement provides that any consid-
eration the plaintiff receives from a judgment debtor discharges, to that extent, the liability of all
others liable for the loss. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51(2) (1982).
270. See, e.g., Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez v. Hernandez,
175 F.3d 1202, 1207–08 (10th Cir. 1999); cf. Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d 265, 272–73 (2d Cir.
1986) (concluding that prior suit against the school board in state court did not bar subsequent
action against the individuals for a constitutional violation).
271. 175 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 1999).
272. Id. at 1204.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1206.
275. See id. at 1206–07.
276. Id. at 1207–08.
277. Id. Obviously, if the federal jury were to award compensatory damages against the em-
ployees, their obligation to pay would be reduced by the amount the plaintiff was paid by the
employer to satisfy the state retaliation judgment. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir.
2010).
278. Gonzalez, 175 F.3d at 1207–08.
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serving the plaintiff’s right to recover the distinctive damages available for
the commission of constitutional torts.279
Applied to litigation under the FTCA and Bivens, these rules provide
an entirely sensible and straightforward set of results. In cases such as Wil-
liams v. Fleming, there would be no warrant for the application of a preclu-
sion rule. The judgment in favor of the government was based not on the
merits of the underlying FTCA claim but, in the words of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, on a defense specific to the federal government.280
The judgment could thus have no preclusive effect on the Bivens claim
against the FDIC examiner. Similarly, in cases like Manning v. United
States, the jury verdict on the Bivens claim against the employees would
stand, and the judgment in favor of the government on the FTCA claim
would simply foreclose any award of damages payable through the Judg-
ment Fund.281
One final puzzle arises from the failure of the district court to coordi-
nate liability in the Manning litigation. Under the terms of the Restatement
of Judgments section 84 (and the related provisions in the Second Restate-
ment),282 a party (like the government) who controls litigation (such as that
brought against an employee on a Bivens theory) may be bound by the
result.283 Section 84 provides for such a result when the party “controls an
action” and has a “proprietary or financial interest in the judgment or in the
determination of a question of fact or of a question of law with reference to
the same subject matter or transaction.”284 The Restatement’s comments
make clear that the master’s decision to assume control of the defense of a
negligence claim against the servant would be sufficient to bring the rule
into play, barring the government from contesting negligence if the issue
had been resolved in the plaintiff’s favor in the earlier proceeding.285
We do not believe that this rule of preclusion through control necessa-
rily applies when the government has assumed defense of a Bivens action.
279. See Minix, 597 F.3d at 830. The court found that a settlement with one defendant did not
necessarily cap the amount of compensatory damages and that, in any case, the plaintiff was
potentially entitled to recover punitive damages from the other defendants, damages that were not
included in the settlement figure. Id. As a result, the plaintiff was free to pursue claims against the
other defendants, notwithstanding the receipt of a measure of satisfaction from one defendant. Id.
280. Williams v. Fleming, 597 F.3d 820, 821 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of a
slander claim against the government because claims for slander are excepted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h)).
281. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2010) (appropriating funds to pay final judgments, awards, or
settlements payable under the FTCA). The judgment fund does not apply to Bivens judgments,
which establish liability personal to the officer.
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 (1982) (discussing rule for persons who
control participation).
283. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942).
284. Id.
285. See id. § 84 cmt. c, illus. 9 (treating the master’s control of a negligence suit against the
servant as sufficient to bind the master to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the question of
negligence).
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As we have explained, the issues to be resolved in a Bivens action differ
from those that control the resolution of an intentional tort claim under the
FTCA. Just as the FTCA disposition should not displace a Bivens action, so
too a Bivens decision should not necessarily control claims under the
FTCA.286 Still, we think that the district court and the parties could identify
common issues of fact and law and agree to have them determined in a
single proceeding. Following the approach of Moon v. Price, district courts
might submit the Bivens claim to a jury and treat agreed-upon elements of
any disposition favoring the plaintiff as binding on the government in any
subsequent determination under the FTCA.287 That would avoid the specta-
cle of a district court overruling a jury verdict on the basis of a disagree-
ment with the jury’s assessment of official misconduct.
III. BIVENS SKEPTICISM AND DYNAMIC TEXTUALISM
In this final part of the article, we consider what the story of the judg-
ment bar can teach us about statutory interpretation. Among the most pro-
vocative and challenging contributions to the theory of statutory
interpretation in the past generation have come from textualists,288 those
who insist along with Professor John Manning that “judges should seek
statutory meaning in the semantic import of the enacted text.”289 The focus
on the enacted text has been said to yield two virtues: to avoid misleading
references to legislative intent (and the problems of delegation inherent in
assigning weight to the comments of a privileged committee chair or floor
leader)290 and to constrain judges more effectively than modes of interpreta-
tion that include references to legislative history.291 On this account, textu-
alist judges play a more modest and faithful role as the agents of the
legislative body than intentionalist judges who may engage in some selec-
286. See Sterling v. United States, 85 F.3d 1225, 1227–28 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing that
where claimant pursued Bivens claim against employee to judgment and lost, claimant was not
precluded from bringing a subsequent action against the United States for negligence because
estoppel will only act to bar an identical claim).
287. See Moon v. Price, 213 F.2d 794, 796–97 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that, even though two
separate actions were filed, plaintiff can only collect one satisfaction for the injury).
288. Leading first-generation textualists include Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Eas-
terbrook, both of whom emphasized a public choice account of the legislative process as a justifi-
cation for focusing on the enacted text. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 533 (1983). On textualism generally, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); see also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 765–97 (4th ed. 2007) (review-
ing the literature on the textualism-intentionalism debate).
289. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2010).
290. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
712–15 (1997) (arguing that textualism can serve to implement constitutional constraints on the
delegation of lawmaking authority to a subset of the legislative assembly).
291. See id. at 718–20 (arguing that textualism minimizes reliance on legislative history to
interpret ambiguous statutory language).
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tivity in deciding how to assign weight to one or more sources of legislative
history.292
The judicial expansion of the judgment bar over the last twenty-five
years calls into question the power of textualism to constrain the interpre-
tive process. At no step in the process of drafting or amending the FTCA
did Congress embrace the extension of the judgment bar to Bivens claims
(which is not to say, of course, that judges cannot use other tools of coordi-
nation to link FTCA litigation and Bivens liability). As initially drafted, the
provision applied only to claims against employees for negligence and only
where those very claims were resolved in the context of vicarious liability
litigation against the government. There was no basis for protecting em-
ployees from suit on theories of liability that had not been resolved in the
earlier litigation. (Thus, a finding of government non-liability based on a
judgment that the employee had committed an intentional tort or had acted
outside the scope of employment would not bar a subsequent suit against
the employee.) Congress achieved this sensible result by narrowing the
judgment bar to claims brought “by reason of the same subject matter.”293 It
borrowed this language from the Restatement of Judgments to clarify that
the non-mutual issue preclusion of the judgment bar applied only to the
issues resolved in the earlier litigation.
Of course, one might regard the misinterpretation of the judgment bar
as an instance of bad interpretation rather than as an instance of (reveal-
ingly) bad textualism. Textualists, after all, do not believe in willfully blind-
ing themselves to the context in which the legislation was adopted and to
the mischief that gave rise to its adoption.294 On this view, textualists might
well accept our account of the judgment bar and join us in calling for a
repudiation of such results as those in Manning v. United States295 and Wil-
liams v. Fleming.296 Indeed, we have been heartened by the reaction of
well-informed students of the legislative process in general and of the
FTCA in particular who share our suggested interpretation of the judgment
292. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 371–72 (2005) (describing
faithful agency as a common trope among textualists); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (describing textualists as faithful
agents and collecting historical support for the view that faithful agency was a common mode of
interpretation at the time of the framing).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2010).
294. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 90–93 (2006) (describing the willingness of textualists to accept arguments from semantic, if
not political, context and from mischief); cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textual-
ism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 733 (2010) (suggesting that the embrace of context and mischief-
based arguments can make textualists sound like members of the legal process school).
295. Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding an FTCA action acts as
a complete bar to any action by a claimant).
296. Williams v. Fleming, 597 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the FTCA’s judgment
bar prohibits a Bivens suit).
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bar. Perhaps, then we can complete our work with a simple call for a judi-
cial about-face.
As much as we hope that the judicial process will correct its interpre-
tive errors, we cannot escape the disquieting perception that the results
achieved in the name of the judgment bar reveal something fundamental
about the process of textualist interpretation. If textualism has grown as a
force in statutory interpretation, there can be no gainsaying its significance
in the courts’ current approach to defining the judgment bar’s relevance to
Bivens liability. As we saw in Part II, lower courts applying the judgment
bar have tended to begin and end with an evaluation of the statutory text.
Viewed in isolation or against the backdrop of recent decisions, the lan-
guage of the judgment bar might bear the meaning that the federal courts
have ascribed to it.297 The lower courts’ embrace of an interpretation so
clearly at odds with the expectations of Congress and the rights of litigants
may reveal something about judicial attitudes towards constitutional tort
claims.
We suspect that the expansive view of the judgment bar rests as much
on what one of us has elsewhere described as Bivens skepticism as it does
on the text of the statute.298 Bivens skepticism has certainly gained a good
deal of traction at the Supreme Court. The Court has not only taken a nar-
row view of the range of constitutional provisions that individuals can en-
force with a Bivens action299 but has also steadily expanded the doctrine of
official immunity to shield official conduct from potential liability.300 In
whittling away at the right of individuals to seek redress from the federal
government, the Court proceeds on the assumption (often mistakenly) that
alternative remedies, although perhaps imperfect, provide adequate protec-
tions. Furthermore, the most skeptical of the Bivens critics, Justices Scalia
and Thomas, have assailed that decision from a textualist vantage point,
taking the view that the Court’s decision to fashion a judge-made right of
action in the first place was illegitimate.301
297. Of course, as we have tried to show, the results achieved through resort to the text make
little functional sense and cannot fairly be attributed to the Congress that enacted the judgment bar
in the first instance or to the Congress that broadened the FTCA to supplement Bivens liability. To
the contrary, Congress appears to have relied on the “same-subject-matter” restriction to limit the
preclusive effect of the judgment against the government.
298. See James E. Pfander, Iqbal and Constitutional Torts: Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of
Judge-Made Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1387, 1405–10 (2010) (ex-
plaining skepticism toward the expansion of the Bivens decision).
299. See generally Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (denying Plaintiff’s proposal to
expand Bivens actions to include redress for retaliation against a claimant exercising property
rights to exclude or unjustly burden a claimant’s rights).
300. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (holding that official immunity
shields officials from all litigation concerns, including discovery).
301. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 6, at 118 (citing Justice Scalia’s critique of Bivens
as the by-product of the heady days of judicial activism in the recognition of judge-made rights of
action).
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We think the textualist critique of Bivens has worked to frame judicial
attitudes toward the preclusive effect of the judgment bar. For skeptics, Biv-
ens lacks legitimacy and encourages frivolous litigation.302 Bivens himself
was in prison at the time he filed his famous action against unknown agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics—a factor that may have influenced Jus-
tice Black’s otherwise curious dissent from the recognition of his right to
sue in federal court.303 Certainly, many of the claims brought in Bivens’s
name since 1971 have sought to address the concerns of pro se prison liti-
gants.304 The connection to prison litigation can make the Bivens action
appear doubly suspect; it was not only judge-made, but it has also served to
encourage prison complaints that courts may view in general as lacking any
merit and any claim to a place on crowded federal dockets. Perhaps, these
framing assumptions explain harsh results. As we have seen, today’s judg-
ment bar decisions almost routinely deny litigants a day in court (on the
basis of an election-of-remedies rationale that the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments termed obsolete thirty years ago) and invalidate favorable ver-
dicts without any apparent concern for jury trial rights.
To the extent textualist judges bring skeptical views of Bivens to bear
in their interpretation of the judgment bar, they engage in what we regard as
a fundamentally improper form of statutory interpretation. Whatever one
can say for the legitimacy of Bivens litigation (and the story is more com-
plex than often assumed),305 Congress has never embraced Bivens skepti-
cism as a general matter or in connection with the judgment bar. For
starters, congressional attitudes towards Bivens surely had little impact on
the drafting of the judgment bar, which was adopted in 1946 some twenty-
five years before the decision came down.306 To the extent claims of serious
official wrongdoing were in view at the time, Congress simply refused to
accept vicarious liability for the intentional torts of government employ-
302. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Conse-
quences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 828 n.95 (2010) (citing figures
on ratio between the number of Bivens suits filed to those which resulted in judgments for, or
payments to, plaintiffs).
303. See James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Narcotics Bureau, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 288–89 (Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik eds.,
2009) (discussing Justice Black’s dissent in Bivens).
304. For an effort to catalog and refute the commonly held view of Bivens claims as predomi-
nantly frivolous, see Reinert, supra note 302.
305. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 6, at 136–38 (describing the Bivens action as a
legitimate federal common law response to the concerns with state-to-state variability in the rec-
ognition of officer suits); see also Pfander, supra note 298, at 1410–12 (noting that Congress’s
adoption of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 tends to ratify and qualify, rather than reject,
the availability of a Bivens remedy).
306. In 1971, the Supreme Court established an independent jurisdictional hook over federal
employees when it acknowledged a private right of action against agents of the Government for
deprivations of constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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ees.307 Congress, however, gave no indication that it meant to foreclose
such litigation or that the judgment bar would block intentional tort claims.
Quite the contrary, all of the evidence suggests that a judgment for the gov-
ernment on the basis that the FTCA did not apply would leave the plaintiff
free to pursue intentional tort claims against the employee. Moreover, to the
extent Congress has spoken in the succeeding years, its enactments in 1974
and 1988 seek to preserve and accommodate the Bivens action rather than
displace it. On a faithful agency theory of statutory interpretation, judges
have little warrant for allowing their skepticism towards Bivens litigation to
inform their interpretation of the judgment bar. Congress has not enacted a
policy of hostility towards Bivens.
If we can generalize from the example of the judgment bar, textualism
may pose a greater risk of infusing judicial values into the interpretive pro-
cess—interpretive dynamism—than competing interpretive theories that
consider a broader range of sources. As the judgment bar so vividly illus-
trates, a textualist judge may encounter the text of a statutory provision
from a perspective quite different from the enacting Congress. In the sixty-
five years since the FTCA became law, federal courts have witnessed and
participated in a dramatic expansion of the scope of the litigated case to the
point where claims against individuals under Bivens and against the govern-
ment under the FTCA now obviously arise from the same transaction or
occurrence for joinder purposes under Rule 20.308 Given the obvious trans-
actional connection between the claims, judges have tended to uncritically
assume that they are “brought by reason of the same subject matter”309
within the meaning of the judgment bar. The text, coupled with a changing
interpretive framework and perhaps a measure of hostility to Bivens claim-
ants, enables the textualist judge to reach a nominally straightforward
answer.
In contrast with the textualism on display in the judgment bar cases
discussed in Part II, we argue for a form of textualism that takes into ac-
count the context of the legislation and the likely purpose of the enacting
Congress. (Elsewhere, one of the authors has referred to this mode of inter-
pretation as “sympathetic textualism” to capture the idea of sympathy to the
307. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 421(h), 60 Stat. 842 (1946); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1948) (excepting “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights”).
308. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (allowing the plaintiff to join claims against more than one defen-
dant so long as the claims meet the same-transaction-or-occurrence test).
309. Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 239 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2006));
Arevalo v. Woods, 811 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2676); Engle v.
Mecke, 24 F.3d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Serra, 786 F.2d at 242); Farmer v. Perrill, 275
F.3d 958, 962 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Engle, 24 F.3d at 135); Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d
322, 333 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2676); Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 433
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2676); Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 122 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2676).
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aims of the enacting Congress.310) Such a mode of interpretation leaves
room for a serious engagement with the goals of the enacting Congress
while recognizing that one must take the words of the text quite seriously
indeed. We thus regard the explanation of the need for the judgment bar—
proffered by the government attorney Francis Shea in 1942311—as a useful
source of insight into the likely purpose of the legislation. Knowledge of
this likely purpose can, in turn, play a crucial role in encouraging a careful
evaluation of the then-prevailing legal context and the likely consequences
of the enacted statutory language in light of the background common law
rules that informed its enactment. By contrast, textualist judges will tend to
discount statements by witnesses and others that purport to explain the pur-
pose of a particular provision. Distrust of such comments may tend to en-
courage a form of textualism that leaves greater room for the play of
judicial priors and intuition. Unconstrained by sympathy with the goal of
the legislation, textualism can create space for judicial value judgments
quite difficult to justify by reference to a faithful agent view of the interpre-
tive process.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps more than any other figure in the interpretive wars of the past
generation, Justice Scalia deserves credit for sparking a renewed interest in
the legal text (be it constitutional or statutory). If, however, as Professor
Monaghan has suggested, “we’re all textualists now,”312 we remain divided
about what sources judges should use in constructing an interpretive context
in which to evaluate the meaning of the text. The critique of legislative
history has dealt an important blow to committee reports, witness state-
ments, and the like as sources of interpretive insight.313 The critique, how-
ever, has left textualist judges free to assess the meaning of statutory texts
without coming to grips with the purpose of the statute or the mischief
Congress sought to address. Unconstrained by any rigorous inquiry into
context and purpose, textualist judges may draw their interpretive values
from a range of sources, including their own intuition about the value of a
particular brand of litigation. So practiced, textualism may produce inter-
pretations of statutes far more dynamic than anything one could achieve
through the guise of legislative history.
310. See generally James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case
for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109 (1999) (defining sympathetic textualism
and applying it to interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
311. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
312. Monaghan, supra note 293, at 740.
313. See Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568–69 (2005) (casting doubt
on the reliability of committee reports and other forms of legislative history as a source of insight
into statutory meaning).
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The judgment bar may offer a case in point. Designed to achieve the
modest goal of ensuring the availability of non-mutual issue preclusion in
favor of government employees, the judgment bar was framed at a fairly
high level of particularity to foreclose not all follow-on litigation against
employees but only such claims as were brought by reason of the “same
subject matter.” Congress did not enact a freestanding principle of non-
duplication but was content to rely upon the common law of claim and issue
preclusion to ensure respect for prior adjudication and limit the plaintiff to a
single satisfaction. In the hands of textualist judges acting with a measure of
skepticism towards Bivens litigation, the judgment bar has nevertheless be-
come an important burden on the right of individuals to pursue constitu-
tional tort claims against the federal government. While the prospect of
Supreme Court correction remains, the growing power of the judgment bar
illustrates the perils of dynamic textualism.
